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Abstract 
Shaping the next century of global politics and power, United States-China relations comprise 
one of the most significant bilateral relationships in the world. A new era of unrestricted warfare 
is one example of how aggression from China could be very costly for the United States. The 
growth of democratic ideals within China decreases the risk of detrimental impacts according to 
democratic peace theory. This thesis explores a multifaceted system of relationships that regulate 
the diffusion of democratic ideology within China, as defined by a proxy-measure characterized 
as human rights by Freedom House. Relative deprivation theory coupled with an adapted Bass 
diffusion model are leveraged as constructs leading to the emergence of a social movement 
influencing China’s system of government. Non-kinetic policy strategies directed towards 
reforming government are assessed utilizing system dynamics. Subsets within system dynamics 
theory, goal dynamics incorporating soft variables, are investigated and implemented within the 
model as a means to evaluate interactions between actors while accounting for competing 
objectives. The resulting model provides a pilot operational assessment of driving factors, 
marrying both policy and strategic influence objectives with mathematically structured analysis 
as applied to this realm of research. Results suggest areas of study for future development that 
potentially further United States objectives within China. Thus, this research illustrates the value 
of applying a system dynamics approach to connect quantitative and qualitative factors in a way 
that provides a more thorough understanding of complex geopolitical interactions.  
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1 
A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL INVESTIGATING THE EFFICACY OF NON-
KINETIC POLICY STRATEGIES ON THE DIFFUSION OF DEMOCRATIC 
IDEOLOGIES IN CHINA 
 
I Introduction 
“The relationship between the United States and China is the most important bilateral 
relationship of the 21st century”  
–Former United States President Barack Obama [1] 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter introduces research objectives, motivation, background, and 
methodology used in this study. United States interests in the world are facilitated when 
democratic ideals are adopted by the populace of countries with government types that 
are more totalitarian in nature. This research centers on gaining an understanding as to 
which strategic influences appear to lead to greater adoption of democratic ideals within 
China. Democratic ideals are defined by a proxy measure of human rights. Human rights 
include both political rights and social freedoms and the measure of these is used to 
indicate the status of democracy within a nation. System dynamics, an operational 
research technique, is applied in order to better understand the complexity of this system 
and its influencing relationships. 
1.2 Objective 
The overall objective of this thesis is to provide insight into influences that spread 
democratic ideals in China. This is addressed by defining sub-objectives that together aid 
progress towards the desired goal. These objectives culminate in answering four research 
questions addressed through these efforts: 
1. What are the key variables involved in spreading democracy in China? 
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2. What are the interacting relationships between the key variables? 
3. What United States policy strategies represent the best options of influence? 
4. How do these strategies create influence? 
The following list details the process employed to answer these questions:  
 Achieve a basis of understanding of the system to be modeled 
 Identify key elements impacting the system 
 Clearly define key elements and identify elements representing real-world 
concepts 
 Understand the relationships between elements 
 Generate a system map of real-world elements and their interactions 
 Model the system based on the generated system map 
 Identify elements with measureable data and incorporate data into the system 
 Identify future measures for elements lacking data and utilize a consistent metric 
scheme for variables without measures. 
 Postulate interaction behaviors for elements without data based on an 
understanding from literature 
 Simulate the system created and validate results 
 Generate policy strategies from a United States perspective  
 Test policy strategy effects on the system and report results 
 Summarize insight based on results and provide recommendations for further 
actions 
 Characterize areas that for future focus which would be of greatest value in 
United States efforts to achieve stated goals 
 
The first process to gain insight for the objective questions requires modeling the 
relevant system to reproduce a level of reality simulating the issues of concern. At the 
time of this writing, China has not shown substantial democratic tendencies. Therefore, a 
simulation of a nation tending towards authoritarian rule is used as a base model. This 
base model is then used in auxiliary simulations exploring the effects of proposed policy 
strategies. Numerous factors influence the results of this system. However, a boundary 
limiting the features to key internal actors and overarching high-level influences is used 
in constructing the model. The resulting pilot model serves as a foundation for policy 
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research conducted within this study. Additionally, the proposed structure is intended to 
serve future exploration of this topic.  
1.3 Motivation 
United States policy towards foreign nations is ever adapting as technologies 
continue to connect nations in ways that were unheard of only a few decades ago. Within 
the last century there have been significant shifts in foreign policy reflecting changes in 
United States goals towards other nations. In particular, the previous era of isolationism 
early in the twentieth century was replaced by a policy of aiding the spread of democratic 
ideals by the start of, and in large part due to, the United States involvement in World 
War II. Former United States President Franklin Roosevelt articulated the transformation 
from a United States foreign policy of neutrality to one of global action by asserting four 
freedoms entitled to every person: the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom to 
worship God in his own way, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear [2]. Mrs. 
Eleanor Roosevelt later referred to these freedoms in her efforts to advocate for human 
rights to include helping draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was 
adopted by the United Nations in 1948 [3]. This deduction is revered as a multi-lateral 
acceptance of a standard of rights inherent to every person regardless of background or 
culture. 
The policy of spreading democracy is widely debated not only by those in power 
under other types of political regimes, but also by those in the academic spheres within 
democracies. The questions addressed within this research are aimed at how to more 
effectively influence the adoption of democratic ideals within China, leaving scholars and 
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political science intellectuals, and, most importantly, elected officials to determine 
whether or not said policies should be the adopted United States foreign policy.  
The current United States policy towards spreading democracy at the time of this 
writing is in support of an expansionist viewpoint. The expansionist viewpoint adopted as 
a foreign policy in the United States has continued since the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations and perhaps has strengthened under the Obama administration 
depending on how it is defined [4], [5]. Former United States President George W. Bush  
stated  that "it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal 
of ending tyranny in our world." [6] Furthermore, under former United States President 
Barack Obama, the spread of democracy was a vital goal and a focus [7]. Clearly recent 
leaders of the United States have been and continue to be concerned with this topic. 
The ideals often held as pillars of democracy are the freedoms for the people, the 
promotion and spread of human rights, the transparency of government, and the spread of 
economic growth, as well as the spread of ideas. These represent the basis for the spread 
of democratic ideals that are captured within the pilot model presented in this research. 
Further in-depth application is discussed in the methodology section in Chapters 4 and 5. 
1.4 Background 
The United States government has several documents outlining the attitude and 
strategies towards Eastern Asian nations, more specifically China. 
U.S. policy objectives [are] to encourage China to uphold international rules and 
norms and to contribute positively to resolving regional and global problems 
…U.S. Policy towards China DoD will also continue to monitor and adapt to 
China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and 
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encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. 
The United States will adapt its forces, posture, investments, and operational 
concepts to ensure it retains the ability to defend the homeland, deter aggression, 
protect our allies, and preserve a principled regional order founded in 
international law and norms that benefit all countries equally.  
-Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016 [8] 
 
China, over the years, has maintained its communist regime roots despite an 
increase in economic freedoms, and recently the hold of the unilateral dictatorship has 
increased in control and power. Human rights are not held to world standards in China. In 
addition, several relevant governing practices impact ties to the United States.  
Popular thought was that capitalism would make China more democratic; 
however in recent history it appears to have had the opposite effect [9]. This speaks to the 
need for a better method to understand the inner-workings of the Chinese governmental 
system as well as a need for identifying the drivers to spreading democracy. The 
development of a system dynamics model may help remedy the difficulty of 
comprehending how the complex interactions between various influences impact 
strategic objectives. System dynamics is well suited for policy analysis given its inherent 
nature [10]. 
1.5 Methodology 
Multifaceted behaviors within a system can be analyzed utilizing system 
dynamics. Such models allow for capturing the behavior of multiple interacting 
relationships by simulating the effects over time [11]. The purpose of system dynamics 
does not categorically lead to mathematically accuracy, but rather it leads to insights and 
conclusions of overall relationship interactions. A better understanding of the overall 
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system, given its size, is the purpose of this research and the reason why system 
dynamics is utilized as the investigative tool. 
The roots of system dynamics are found in continuous differential equations [12]. 
Feedback loops derived from relationships define the systems responses to inputs in 
relation to time. The behavior of the relations is derived from expert knowledge and 
documented research that form the structure for behavior interaction. Analyzing the key 
relationships that are interconnected in the overall system of influences using system 
dynamics modelling appears to be a previously unexplored approach to evaluate the 
effectiveness of United States strategic initiatives on the spread of spread democratic 
ideals within China.  
1.6 Assumptions and Limitations 
An iterative process of analyzing pertinent literature was utilized to condense 
various forms of influences to categories summarizing the highest levels of influence. 
Assumptions and limitations applied within the model constructs are listed as follows: 
 The basis for impacted feedback loops explored in this research is founded on 
research as well as discussion with China experts. The components of the 
included model represent those factors thought to have the greatest relevancy to 
the modeled process. These structures do not represent all influences to the 
process but rather only those understood to be most pertinent to this research. 
 This initial model does not account for the effect Chinese government actions 
have on United States policies. United States actions are treated as an 
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unconstrained input to the model. This exogenous variable remains constant 
throughout the simulation. 
 For variables without data or measurements, soft variable methodology is applied. 
Relationships between these variables are based on findings documented in the 
literature. Each relationship is shaped by general system dynamics behaviors and 
overall provide either positive or negative contributions to the flows between 
variables and stocks. Although additional data and differential equations dictating 
variable values within the system would more accurately predict the impact of the 
influences, the complexity of analyzing each existing relationship falls outside of 
the scope of this research. Suggestions for future measurements are included 
within the discussion of each component, and a higher fidelity study in this area is 
recommended for follow-on research. 
 The horizon of the model is simulated for 30 years. This provides sufficient time 
to analyze the condition of the system while not extending to a point where the 
simulation is extrapolating too far outside of the scope of practical assumptions. 
This additionally extends the five and ten year timelines suggested for policy 
assessment [13]. 
 The model is incremented in time steps of 1 year. This is consistent with available 
data incorporated in the model.  
 Actions endogenous to the system are consistent for 1 year periods. Actions 
exogenous to the system, to include policy strategies, remain consistent for the 
duration of the simulation.  
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 Exogenous variables to the model are estimated when relationships are not clearly 
identified within literature. 
Additional assumptions and limitations specific to the simulated model are discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
1.7 Summary 
Chapter 1 stated the objective of this thesis, established the motivation, and 
briefly discussed the background and methodology applied within this research. Chapter 
2 discusses the context of motivation for this research and establishes the circumstances 
surrounding the investigation of this issue. Chapter 3 provides a literature review of 
social theories and methodology approach utilized. It describes system dynamics 
modeling and expounds on key applications of this approach relevant to the methodology 
used in this research. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the methodology and approach 
applied in model formulation as well as the policy design. Chapter 5 provides a more 
detailed formulation of the model components and the relationships between model 
components. A detailed description of each component is provided including a brief 
background of the component as well as an overview of its incorporation in the overall 
model. Chapter 6 presents the tests used to validate the model and variables as well as 
results of applied policy strategy. Chapter 7 summarizes the results and conclusions and 
discusses recommendations for future research.  
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II Research Context 
America’s support for democracy and human rights goes beyond idealism — it’s a matter 
of national security. Democracies are our closest friends, and are far less likely to go to 
war…. Respect for human rights is an antidote to instability... 
 
-Former United States President Barack Obama [14] 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter outlines the underlying motivation for this study. The United States 
and China relationship is vital in global politics. As such, factors that can positively 
impact this relationship warrant careful evaluation using additional techniques such as 
systems dynamics modeling. A brief background of this topic is provided, including an 
overview of United States – China relations, a discussion of democracy, and an overview 
of democratic and human rights policy within both the United States and China.  
2.2 United States-China Relations 
China has steadily increased its global presence over the years economically and 
militarily. With a long-term outlook, a sizeable population, and a driven party, China 
stands as a force to contend with on the world stage. There is little doubt to the growing 
power of China and its role as a major contributor to molding history in the coming 
decades. China is headed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in which membership 
is required in order for individuals to reach a status of sanctioned influence within the 
country. Communist ideals have significantly shaped its international interactions and “in 
the last decade, the Chinese regime has shown itself to be anti-democratic, no friend of 
free markets, a first-class cyber bully and more interested in rewriting or ignoring 
international norms than in respecting them” [15]. As China expands its power and reach 
in the global arena, communist ideals will continue to spread and could raise tensions 
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with or even overpower democracy on a global scale. This is evidenced in several border 
conflicts China currently engages with in the regions of Kashmir, the Baekdu mountains, 
and parts of the Himalayan Mountains, among others.  
Communism is one of the greatest threats to the spread of democratic ideology. It 
has been cited as a believed hindrance to the China-United States relations in global 
conflicts, trade, and economic dealings with China [16], [17]. In spite of China's “lie in 
wait” mentality, it has recently started exerting its powers worldwide. This is seen in 
several of the recent territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands and those in the South 
China Sea [18]. The number of those willing to oppose China’s global aspirations and 
violation of international norms are dwindling. The United States remains one of the few 
countries with the resources, strategic positioning, and most importantly motivation to 
create a change within the regime. Although China has significantly less conventional 
military firepower than the United States, it has far more manpower and arguably a 
superior economic position of global influence [19]. 
A non-democratic China is a significant threat despite the comparison of military 
firepower. China is engaging in unrestricted warfare to promote its values [20]. A book 
published in 1999 by two People’s Liberation Army Colonel’s titled Unrestricted 
Warfare outlines a strategy of unconventional methods of attack designed to defeat a 
superpower while circumventing the need for direct military action [20]. These methods 
are not traditional methods of war, but rather target the crippling of the United States 
influence and power through unconventional attacks in the areas of economic warfare, 
cyber warfare, cultural warfare, and other unconventional assaults. For example, a study 
commissioned by the United States Department of Defense and conducted by Kevin 
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Freeman, author of Secret Weapon, related the role of economic warfare in precipitating 
the 2008 financial collapse [21]. Many experts, like Freeman, believe multiple non-
democratic nation states have specific economic warfare units tasked with crippling the 
United States economy in 2008 style financial attacks [21].  
A traditional military response from the United States is ineffective as an option 
to viably protect against such attacks. Even if it were possible to force a government 
regime change within China using kinetic means, it is evidenced that such an approach is 
ineffective and at best may lead to a temporary and highly unstable regime [22].  
However, if there were a way to assist in transitioning power or ideals in China to 
become a more peaceful or democratic nation, this could be an essential step in 
improving relations and decreasing risk and tensions between the United States and 
China. Greater transparency in the ruling party of China as well as improving human 
rights, would have a significant impact towards building trust between the two nations 
while disarming some of the barriers that currently exist. Democratic peace theory 
postulates that a key factor to predicting peace between nations is the government system 
of democracy. Democracy is further discussed in the light as a potential tool for peace 
and the improvement in relations between the United States and China.  
2.3 Democracy 
2.3.1 Democratic Peace Theory 
Democratic Peace theory posits that democracies are less likely to go to war with 
one another due to the pacifying influence of democracy. Presumably this includes the 
objectives of all types of warfare, both conventional as well as unconventional. This 
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liberalist theory is criticized by realists who claim that the logic is flawed and therefore 
peace seen between democracies may not be due to the democratic nature of these states 
[23]. Statistical evidence shows that wars between democracies are very infrequent if 
they occur at all depending on data assumptions within various research efforts. An 
example of such research is provided in Table 1 where dyads represent a pair of state and 
each year of existence provides an additional observation point recorded in the table. 
Table 1 Dispute Behavior of Politically Relevant Interstate Dyads, 1946-1986 [24] 
Highest Level 
of Dispute 
Both 
States 
Democratic 
One or Both 
Nondemocratic 
Total 
Dyads 
No dispute 3864 24503 28367 
Threat of force 2 39 41 
Display of 
force 4 116 120 
Use of force 8 513 521 
War 0 32 32 
Total 3878 25203 29081 
 
In Table 2, the percent of escalation of disputes when both states are democratic is less 
for each category when compared to disputes where one or both states are nondemocratic, 
Table 2 . 
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Table 2 Percent of Interactions within Dyads 
Highest Level of 
Dispute 
Both 
States 
Democratic 
One or Both 
Nondemocratic 
Total 
Dyads 
No Dispute 99.64% 97.22% 97.54% 
To threat of force 0.05% 0.15% 0.14% 
To display of 
force 0.10% 0.46% 0.41% 
To use of force 0.21% 2.04% 1.79% 
To war 0.00% 0.13% 0.11% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Regardless of whether democracies go to war with each other, there is supporting 
evidence for the lessened probability of war between democracies due to a commonality 
in values and ideals [25]. 
Although the motives of a nation expending efforts to support democracies 
internationally is debated, it is evidenced in literature that there may be some truth and 
benefit resulting from increasing the number of democracies in the world. A discussion 
paper published by the Belfar Center for Science and International Affairs [26] 
summarizes the theoretical benefits of democracies for the United States and serves as a 
starting point for the purpose of spreading democratic ideals. The arguments presented by 
the Center are listed in the following outline:  
1. It's good for the citizens of new democracies; 
 Democracy leads to liberty and liberty is good 
 Liberal democracies are less likely to use violence against their own 
people 
 Democracy enhances long-run economic performance 
 Democracies never have famines 
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2. Democracy is good for the international system 
 The evidence for the democratic peace 
 Why there is a democratic peace: the causal logic 
o Normative explanations 
o Institutional/structural explanations 
o Combining normative and structural explanations 
3. The spread of democracy is good for the United States 
 Democracies will not go to war with the United States 
 Democracies don't support terrorism against the United States 
 Democracies produce fewer refugees 
 Democracies will ally with the United States 
 American ideals flourish when others adopt them 
 
These arguments, even if only a partial correct indication of the beneficial nature 
of the reality that could exist between the United States and China, indicate that it is 
certainly worth considering and exploring the ways in which the United States can further 
efforts to promote democracy in China due to the potential future global impact of China. 
2.3.2 Democracy Definition 
A clear definition of what constitutes democracy remains inconsistent throughout 
the literature. Technically, a pure democracy does not exist, even in the United States. 
Rather, a modified form biased towards various ideals of democracy shapes the 
definitions associated with the term. Although debatable, the often-associated elements of 
the concept of democracy are separation of powers, freedom of opinion, religious liberty, 
the right to vote in fair elections, governance based on public interest, and the assurance 
of basic human rights. A succinct definition classifies democracy as a "form of 
government, where a constitution guarantees basic personal and political rights, fair and 
free elections, and independent courts of law" [27]. These classification of ideal 
objectives are summarized into two categories: political rights and social freedoms which 
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collectively are referred to as human rights. Human rights, therefore, are the focus of this 
research as they accurately reflect the objectives of the democratic ideals sought through 
various United States political policy. 
Unilaterally, it is difficult to achieve credibility when defining concepts that apply 
globally; the United Nations, however, clearly defines human rights in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights developed as a result of World War II [28]. The United 
States, as well as other members of the United Nations, are expected to uphold the 
declared rights “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” 
[28]. It has been debated and some have criticized that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is “a Western-biased document which fails to account for the cultural 
norms and values which exist in the rest of the world” [29]. There exists a debate as to 
whether or not human rights are universal and whether or not the UN document is valid 
for all peoples. However, both China and the United States are members of the UN which 
has adopted the document and agreed to this standard. While this bilateral standard is 
clear, measuring whether a state is upholding it is not a straightforward matter. 
2.3.3 Democracy Quantification 
While many experts have attempted to define and establish a standard for 
evaluating democracy among nations, two of the most well-cited and credible measures 
are Freedom House and Polity IV [30]. Freedom House is cited as the best known 
measure of democracy while the Polity project provides a wider range of data for a fewer 
amount of countries based on its minimalist definition of democracy [31]. These two 
measures value different aspects of democracy: the Freedom House measurement stresses 
a high level of individual rights and personal freedoms while Polity IV measurements 
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stress the constraints on elites and checks and balances within a government. The two 
measures dominate the political science literature as barometers of democracy with 
neither clearly dominating. Norris, in the text Driving Democracy, has shown these 
measures to be correlated [31]. Polity's 20 point score and the Freedom House 7 point 
rating have a correlation coefficient of 0.904 [31]. Regardless of the chosen 
measurement, the differences in application of the two measurements are assumed to be 
small enough to be used interchangeably with regards to the topic of this research. For 
this reason, a single measurement, Freedom House, is used as a measurement of the 
desired outcomes for the model created in this research.  
2.3.4 Freedom House Measure 
Established in 1941, Freedom House is a United States government funded non-
governmental organization that believes the spread of democracy is the best weapon 
against totalitarian ideologies [32]. Freedom House provides information to help frame 
the policy debate in the United States and allows for assessment in progress on human 
rights globally [32]. It aims to act as a catalyst in the human rights debate worldwide 
using analysis and advocacy to achieve action and help progress the state of political 
rights and civil liberties globally [32].  
Experts on each country are consulted to determine the final ratings and status 
using their democracy scale of nations. The process involves using a three-tiered rating 
system scoring countries based on a set of criteria which is included in Appendix A. 
These scores are combined to classify each country based on a political rights and civil 
liberties rating on a scale from 7 to 1. The average of these two ratings is used to classify 
a country's status.  
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China is rated as a 7 in political rights and a 6 in civil liberties according to the 
2016 Freedom House Report. That equates to a status of "not free." A rating of 7 on 
political rights means that there are few or no political rights due to severe government 
oppression. A rating of 6 in civil liberties is categorized as countries that strongly limit 
the rights of expression and association allowing few civil liberties such as religious and 
social freedoms, highly restricted private business and open or free private discussion 
[33]. 
The chief advantages of this measure for application within this study center on 
its recognition and its consistency. The Freedom House scale of 1 to 7 provides a basis 
for consistent analysis across studies that is repeatable and clear. It's a quantifiable 
measure of the political development of countries allowing for global comparison from 
1972 onward using time-series data utilizing a continuous measure. However, there is 
certain subjectivity required in the art of determining each country’s scores. Critics have 
claimed the Freedom House scores may over-emphasize US and Western values [34]. In 
addition, the consistency of the evaluations across each location over time has been 
questioned as it does not include an economic dimension in the analysis, and the ultimate 
value of a single indicator or number may not be useful for evaluating policies [31]. 
Despite these criticisms, the Freedom House Measure has championed human rights 
globally and appears to be a widely-accepted measure of democracy in the political 
science community. The specific questions used to determine assigned ratings as well as 
the general methodology are included in Appendix A. A further in-depth explanation of 
the application of the measure within this model is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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2.4 United States Policy on Democracy 
2.4.1 General Policy 
There are tangible stakes linked to the number of democracies and non-
democracies not just for the United States but globally. Since the end of World War II the 
United States has played a significant role in broadening democracies in Western Europe 
[35]. The United States engages in various activities designed to positively influence the 
ideals of democracy within the population of various regions. Officially the stance 
promoted by the United States government states that “supporting democracy not only 
promotes such fundamental American values as religious freedom and worker rights, but 
also helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global arena in which the United 
States can advance its national interests. In addition, democracy is the one national 
interest that helps to secure all the others ” [36]. With these guiding principles of 
encouraging democracy globally, the United States has been and continues to be an active 
advocate, spreading democracy through promotion and policy efforts. Each United States 
President since the end of World War II has articulated their support for human rights and 
greater freedom across the world [37]. 
2.4.2 United States Background on Democracy in China 
Specific to China, the United States has a steady but what appears to be, a more 
passive approach in spreading democracy and its ideals. Nixon opened trade and 
established the underpinnings for United States-China political dealings in 1972 [38]. It 
was not until the violent Chinese government crackdown on student groups in Tiananmen 
Square 1989 that the United States took a specific focus on furthering human rights in 
China. Former United States President George H.W. Bush assisted dissidents, although 
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he did not respond against the "butchers of Beijing” after the Tiananmen Square incident. 
Former United States President Bill Clinton created a separation between economic ties 
to China and human rights issues, having faith that the capitalism in China would make 
efforts on its own. Clinton's Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, released a statement 
"Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to 
democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great 
country" [39]. This policy remained consistent as the theme throughout the Clinton 
administration and continued into the following presidency.  
Former United States President George W. Bush focused on religious freedoms in 
China while also anticipating that the economy of China would eventually lead to 
political changes as seen in South Korea and Taiwan [40]. South Korea and Taiwan, 
however, relied on the United States for defense and support in a way that allowed the 
United States to leverage greater influence on political changes within these nations. The 
faith that has been placed in a stronger economy leading to democratization of China has 
so far been misplaced. The economic robustness has not lead China closer to democracy 
as evidenced by reality [9], [41]. The rise in wealth has enabled a rich authoritarian 
regime; recently, President Xi has lessened certain freedoms since coming to power in 
2012 [9]. 
Former United States President Barack Obama focused heavily on improving 
relations between the United States and China during his first term. However, during his 
second term in office, it has been speculated that a shift towards the Middle East and a 
change from Hillary Clinton to John Kerry as Secretary of State allowed relations 
between the United States and China to deteriorate and lose focus [42]. The recent 
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election, shifting the party in control of the White House and the balance in Congress, 
raises the question regarding what this administration will focus on regarding these 
issues.  
At the time of this writing, President Donald Trump has yet to lay out a plan for 
how the United States will focus its policies on China and human rights abroad. When 
questioned on his opinion of Turkey's coup in July 2016, Trump stated that in regards to 
promoting civil liberties, the United States has enough problems and "it’s very hard for us 
to get involved in other countries when we don't know what we are doing and we can’t 
see straight in our own country" [43]. Additionally, he closed his Cleveland discussion 
talking about the movement of America First "Meaning we are going to take care of this 
country first before we worry about everybody else in the world" [43]. 
There has been speculation that President Trump may alter the classification of 
Taiwan and potentially change the United States policy on One China; however, overall it 
appears from statements made by President Trump thus far that he is unlikely to be 
willing to expend significant resources for improving conditions or spreading democracy 
in China [44].  
Former Central Intelligence Agency director and previously senior adviser to 
President Donald Trump on national security, defense and intelligence during his 
transition to office, James Woolsey, released an opinion article stating his belief that 
challenging the Chinese social and political system is a risky endeavor [45]. It appears 
from his comments that despite United States commitment to spreading freedom, it is 
unlikely at this time that the Trump administration will see making great strides in this 
area with regards to China as a primary goal. The policy framing that appears to be 
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considered by the new administration makes a model summarizing the potential impact 
on democratic ideals within China of increased value and significance. 
2.4.3 Military Stance on China 
Potential conflicts and the possibility of escalating tensions with China and the 
United States are predicted to increase in the future. Strategic Command [46] has stated 
goals of acquiring better deterrence methods while acknowledging that the nature of such 
future conflicts is complex. The commander of the United States Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM), highlighted the attention warranted by China's actions following China's 
increase in military investments and actions in the South China Sea. The overarching 
priorities of the United States STRATCOM include deterring strategic attack against the 
United States and providing assurance to allies [46]. The effort and attention required in 
United States-China relations is not equivalent to a single democratic nation or those 
countries we term as close allies. Strategic distrust is a term describing United States-
China relations. One of the three root causes of this distrust found in a study from the 
Brookings Institute was the insufficient comprehension or appreciation of each other’s' 
policy making processes and relations between the government and other entities [47]. 
An agreement on basic values of human rights may be one step leading towards a 
brighter future in United States-China relations and eliminating some mistrust in dealings 
between these countries. Official United States efforts in China regarding advancing 
human rights are outlined in the Human Rights in China and United States Policy report 
for Congress that is released for each new Congress session [18].  
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2.4.4 United States Efforts for Democracy 
The United States financially supports the spread of democracy and expends a 
certain portion of the budget each year in so doing. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) is the United States primary government agency 
responsible for administering civilian foreign aid. A portion of this budget is directly 
expended to promote democracy and provide governance assistance. The aid is 
distributed following a pattern where strategically important countries receive the 
majority of such assistance and additional countries receive only modest sums [48]. 
The United States spent $43 billion in total obligations for international efforts 
across the globe in fiscal year 2014. Of those obligations the United States spent an 
approximated $62 million, approximately one seventh of one percent of the total, on 
China [49]. The total amount of reported funds that the United States spent on governing 
justly and democratically in fiscal year 2014 was $2.87 billion [50]. Approximately $3.8 
million, also approximately one seventh of one percent of the total, was appropriated for 
the promotion of democracy in China for the same year, a mere fraction of what the 
United States spent in other regions and nations of the globe [50]. “The Middle East and 
North Africa have long been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in the world” 
[51]. This research posits that the United States and China form one of the most 
significant strategic relationships of this century especially from a perspective of the risk 
of unconventional warfare, and that a potential way to reduce risk in this relationship is 
through greater shared ideals. One purpose of this research is to explore what changes 
result from additional focus and efforts within China. The shared ideals, realized through 
the spread of democracy, may have an impact at benefiting United States-China relations.  
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2.5 China Policy on Democracy 
2.5.1 Politics in China 
The democratic key values of human rights are not unique to Western culture 
mindset. Violations of human rights within China not only go against those rights upheld 
by the United States and the United Nations as unalienable, but these violations also 
conflict with the Chinese constitution. The constitution of the People's Republic of China 
guarantees the right to vote, freedom of speech, religion, press and assembly in articles 
34-36 [52]. In practice, however, these rights are restricted by the ruling authoritarian 
government who regards such rights to be subordinate to government authority. A United 
States congressional study titled “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 
114th Congress” completed in 2015 by Thomas Lum, Asian affairs specialist, examines 
ongoing human rights issues [18]. This report, as a congressional study, is available to the 
public and covers many of the current events at the time of Lum’s study relating to 
human rights in China. It should be noted that several studies have been completed by the 
Congressional Research Service to assist in informing United States leadership of policy 
issues and options in dealing with China. Human rights are closely linked to democratic 
ideals, and at least three such reports have been written after 2011.  
Those seeking religious freedom and ethnic minorities are the groups that 
experience the greatest incidences of human rights violations. Furthermore, labor 
violations, primarily related to Chinese citizens working in factories, has been a source 
for social unrest and is a root cause for many protests [53]. Additionally, the reports 
address the restriction on information within China, a key factor in efforts for change 
[54]. The censorship within China is an effective source of control for the CCP and 
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proves to significantly impede the spread of democratic ideals. The human rights reports 
to Congress and their key findings, including the highlighted topics just mentioned, form 
the basis for the conceptual model created for this research. Policy efforts selected as 
influencing the modeled system are based on these reports as well. 
2.5.2 Political Trends and Predictions in China 
Within China, activists and the number of those championing the human rights 
cause continues to grow. Central Party School, a leading CCP think tank, issued a report 
in 2008 summarizing the trend of rising democratic consciousness creating an urgent 
need for political system reforms [55]. Further reports from think-tanks regulated by the 
CCP have highlighted the need for a systematic government change [56]. 
Chinese expert David Shambaugh, who has worked with the DoD, CIA, State 
Department and National Security Council to help develop United States policy, released 
an article predicting the collapse of the CCP [57]. Shambaugh maintains that the evidence 
is overwhelming in indicating concerns within the CCP that will result in a violent 
turnover within the regime [58]. Although this might not be the overwhelming belief 
among China experts (it is risky to predict the fall of an authoritarian regime) it warrants 
consideration given Shambaugh’s experience. A violent turnover leading to instability 
within the nation would be of concern globally due to economic ties and other 
dependencies between China and other nations. 
2.6 Summary 
The United States and China have conflicting interests that have led to a rising 
tension and unconventional conflicts within recent decades. Nations with more similar 
beliefs like democratic values may see less conflict. China states several key democratic 
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values within its constitution and is expected to uphold a level of human rights as a 
member of the United Nations. The United States has a policy stance of promoting 
democracy globally although only a fraction of its overall spending supports efforts 
within China. This gap in spending may indicate an opportunity to see additional funding 
if a strategy of where the funds will be most effective is identified. Historically economic 
capitalism within China was expected to lead to a more democratic nation; however, data 
measured by Polity IV and Freedom House indicate otherwise. The new current 
administration has not yet specified a strategic stance within this region. Efforts 
identifying influence that would support United States goals may contribute to additional 
analysis and consideration of this matter. This is a motivation to investigate spreading 
democratic ideals within China from a high-level strategic perspective between nations. 
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III Foundational Model Philosophies 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 This chapter introduces specific theories used in the construction of the system 
designed to address the research objectives. Literature reviews of several topics are 
included to provide an overview of foundational concepts concerning the application of 
both quantitative as well as qualitative methods for policy analysis. Topics include social 
movement theory, diffusion theory, and system dynamics. Explicit topics within system 
dynamics include soft variables and goal dynamics. These two sub topics aid in the 
understanding of the system framework of model organization. Discussion contained in 
this chapter sets the context with which the system dynamics methodology is applied in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.2 Social Movement Theory 
Several paths exist for progress to occur on the issue of human rights within 
China:  
 Enforced change from an outside entity (such as a military takeover) 
 Enforced change from within (a revolution or coup causing a change in the 
leadership, government, or system of government) 
 Pressure from an outside entity (such as trade sanctions) 
 Pressure from within (reformation of policies in relation to an issue) 
Brute force regime changes are costly, often temporary, and foster resentment. Grassroots 
efforts have, in recent years in particular, proven to be the most powerful source of 
dramatic political change in countries with diverse structures [59]. For these reasons, 
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kinetic approaches are not considered in the scope of this study. Non-kinetic methods are 
explored as a means to facilitate and leverage a movement towards democratic ideals 
which is already present within China. 
 Using system dynamics to investigate initiatives that spread the democratic ideals 
of human rights within China requires a framework. The enforced paths are not 
considered in this study as they often lead to instability and temporary solutions. To 
achieve the goal of spreading human rights within China non-kinetically, the system in 
place currently must evolve or rather, must reform. This requires that the system of 
governing and regime can adapt to and embrace reform. The process of reform can be 
modeled as a result of a social movement. 
Social movements have occurred throughout history, creating change across the 
globe. At times they are directed at the government in order to spur change in a 
circumstance while at other times they are directed at raising awareness to change public 
opinion on a topic [60]. The definitions of a social movement are ambiguous; however, 
for the purposes of this research, a social movement is defined as “a set of opinions and 
beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the 
social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” [61]. 
3.2.1 Stages of Movements 
There is a lifecycle to social movements. Christiansen [62] discusses a theory of 
four stages that provides insight into understanding key factors for many emerging 
movements. As a structure to understanding collective action in the form of social 
movement, there are four defined stages as depicted in Figure 1 [62], [63].  
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Figure 1 Stages of a Movement 
These stages provide a framework which aids understanding of how lasting change can 
be brought about without transitioning the government or system of government in place. 
Of note is that the fourth stage of decline can result in success or failure of the movement 
in several forms.  
3.2.2 Social Movement Theory 
Social movement theory is an area of study that arose in the attempt to explain 
why public movements came to be. Klandermans suggests that two distinctive classes of 
theories exist in regards to social movements: classical approaches and contemporary 
approaches [64]. Classic theory emphasizes that a general expectation or deprivation 
causes protest while contemporary theory holds that resources and structure of reality can 
lead to a unified goal that allows for a movement to occur [64]. Several predominant 
theories in literature include theories labeled as social depravation, framing, social 
movement impact, new social movements, emerging cultural perspective, resource 
mobilization, and rational choice [64]. While this review does not cover all theories, a 
general description of the classical and modern approaches is further discussed. 
A classic social movement theorist, Tocqueville was among the first to note that 
unrest occurs when conditions are improving [65]. A similar conclusion is what led the 
rising contemporary theorists to seek new explanations for social movements. Several 
theories arose explaining the “relative depravation theory” such as the J-Curve 
1: 
Emergence
2: 
Coalescence
3: 
Bureaucratization
4:
Decline
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hypothesis; however, a study investigating the theories surrounding this phenomenon 
deemed that the popular theories were not supported by evidence [66]. An explanation 
offered for the phenomenon by Taylor “is that people evaluate their outcomes against 
subjective rather than absolute standards” derived from reference groups and past 
experiences [66], and a modern approach to this theory asserts that a refined version of 
the theory may see a gap occur if there is a sudden downturn in improving conditions 
[67]. Regardless of the truth to Tocqueville’s original observations, an assertion that 
withstands criticism is that social movements arise when there is a gap in expectations. 
“Although discontent may be an essential condition for social movements, discontent 
does not always lead to a social movement or other form of collective behavior” [63]. 
A modern approach, such as the resource mobilization theory, holds that people 
protest utilizing social networks and are both resourceful and organized. Resource 
mobilization theory has, however, been criticized as underestimating the importance of 
harsh social conditions and the frustrations that result in an increased level of social 
movement as well as eliminating the emotional aspect involved in a movement [63].  
A comparative political study completed in 2015 validated the importance of the internet 
in connecting people and sharing ideas and their influence to bring about change within 
CCP regime actions [68]. This supports the resource mobilization theory noting evidence 
that access to the internet and connecting grievances with citizens allows for the 
mobilization of a civil action creating change [68]. Another study relating several 
components key to the model within China, applies both modernization social movement 
theory as well as relative depravation theory in its goal of relating civil unrest causes to 
the protests that have occurred in China [69]. For the purposes of this research, 
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components of each theory are applied within the system dynamics model. Relative 
deprivation is represented as a root cause for civil unrest, and resource mobilization 
theory is represented in the ability for the cause to take form in the shape of citizen 
action.  
3.3 Diffusion Theory 
 Democracy and human rights are powerful forces even when they are 
encapsulated only in the form of an idea. Actions and structures exist that represent the 
physical forms defining the reality of democracy; however, in the realm of social 
movements, the idea that is perpetuated is at first an abstract concept that participants are 
trying to achieve. Therefore this research represents the diffusion of human rights, a 
proxy measure of democracy, by incorporating within the model the concept of spreading 
the ideology of human rights. Although there are not authoritative models that capture the 
spread of ideas, several similar areas of research prove useful and are utilized within this 
research’s methodology. This section provides an overview of several applications of 
diffusion models. 
3.3.1 Traditional Diffusion Model 
The Bass model of diffusion is a widely known application model within 
management science [70]. It has typically been applied within marketing and is often 
used as a forecasting technique to understand the sales of new products. Using 
differential equations, the spread of the product adoption rate can be represented with 
regards to time. The following equations summarize the key interactions found within the 
Bass model. Equation 1 displays the formulation as Bass presented it [71] 
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𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑞𝑇(𝑡) + (𝑝 − 𝑞)𝐴(𝑡) −
𝑝[𝐴(𝑡)]2
𝑇(𝑡)
, 
(Eq 1) 
where: 
S(t) = rate of adoption 
p = innovation coefficient referring to a person accepting an innovation based on 
impersonal communication like advertising 
q = imitation coefficient referring to persons requiring personal communication 
within the social system to become customers 
A(t) = number of adopters 
T(t) = number of total possible adopter or market saturation limit. 
This equation has been adapted to represent interactions within a system to include basic 
marketing. If given enough time, the market becomes saturated and all potential adopters 
become adopters using these model parameters. They are influenced by the rates that 
represent imitation based on word of mouth and innovators, or those who are the initial 
adopters of the product based on product messaging. 
This system has not only been used in marketing, but its foundational concepts 
have also been expanded to incorporate its concepts into innovations in several areas of 
research. For example, Bass model concepts have been used to model the diffusion of a 
nation’s system of government transformation to democracy on a global scale based on 
polity data, illustrating the usefulness of such concepts in more than just the marketing 
realm of product adoption [72].  
3.3.2 Additional Diffusion Models 
 Further models of diffusion found in literature include applications of an 
epidemiological model as depicted in Figure 2. This figure is adapted from a study 
quantifying the spread of ideas by creating a model that parametrizes the spread of 
Feynman diagrams through several theoretical physics communities [73] 
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Figure 2 Traditional Epidemiological Diffusion 
Figure 2 is included to describe the concepts of different diffusion approaches that clearly 
have varying assumptions guiding the interactions between variables within the proposed 
model. Diffusion models extend further to include portraying the spread of two political 
parties within a system utilizing non-linear relationships and epidemiological approaches 
[74], integrating diffusion modeling competition between two similar pharmaceutical drugs 
[75], and treating diffusion as an infectious disease to model the spread of gangs within a 
population [76]. The mentioned alternative diffusion models have all been published after 
2000; however, a thorough study of techniques utilized in diffusion theory application 
highlights the different applications of those prior to 1998 relating to social movements [77]. 
Strang summarizes several assertions related to hypothesized factors effecting social 
movements such as the impact of suppression on dampening the amount of protests and 
delves into a deeper understanding of applied models’ guiding mechanisms that cause the 
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formulations of the diffusion itself [77]. These additional models add value to the discussion 
of formalizing the relationships representing the spread of the idea of democracy. Future 
investigation may include comparisons of different diffusion model structures applied to this 
research.  
Tangential to diffusion models, Kijek and Kijek [78] compare the Bass model with 
several other models to evaluate the diffusion of broadband internet within several countries. 
This study offers a comparison, concluding that of the commonly used diffusion models, it is 
difficult to identify a superlative model from the examined instances [78]. Within the scope 
of this research, an expansion adapting the Bass diffusion modeling concept is chosen to 
represent the spread of democratic ideals in China due to the nature of the simplicity of 
the Bass model with regards to the variables as well as representation of components of 
interest.  
3.4 System Dynamics 
The forward thinkers of the world constantly solve problems and try to make 
sense of what's happening around them. That is how Newton’s Laws came about, how 
electricity was harnessed, and how virtually all modern technologies came to be. The 
engineers, inventors, and scientists gained insight into the way the world works. The 
drive for insight is the same objective with system dynamics modeling: gaining insight 
into a complex reality. 
Often, these discoveries and forward leaps involve some sort of simplification: an 
assumption or abstraction that allows for applicability and usefulness. As of yet, it is not 
possible to create a perfect model of a complex political situation; however, even 
imperfect models can allow for discerning valuable results. With this in mind, system 
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dynamics can be used in an attempt to model difficult relationships, not only to see direct 
effects, but also to gain insights into the secondary and tertiary effects between correlated 
and subsequent connections. The connections within a system are often difficult to 
understand and many connections exist. System dynamics can assist in providing insight 
when intuition alone is insufficient. A key to system dynamics modeling is that it 
systematically accounts for the influence of complex relationships over time.  
System dynamics is an analysis methodology for industrial practices developed at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management by Jay Forrester 
in the 1950s [12]. It was later expanded into World Dynamics as well as Urban 
Dynamics. It has grown in worldwide recognition within the academic community and is 
also utilized by corporations and industry to investigate such areas as economics, public 
policy, social sciences, and management among others [10]. Despite disagreements of 
approach and application among leading analysts in the field, there is an overall 
consensus on the value of system dynamics. Tang and Vijay [79] further explore the 
direction of these approaches. They conclude that, although the field has not expanded of 
late, the overall methodology is novel in combining reality and difficult policy decisions 
with system dynamics modeling methods. 
3.4.1 Evolution 
One of the greatest attributes of system dynamics is the intuitiveness inherent in 
the design of the method. Meadows mentions that the most easily understood but rarely 
applied systems thinking could provide several benefits [80]. Meadows created a primer 
to allow for an introduction to a progressive way of considering a system. It is widely 
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accepted that system thinking is a critical tool in addressing political, social, economic, 
and environmental challenges faced around the world [80].  
The concept of thinking in the form of systems can be traced to ancient Greece 
[81]. Several different types of methodologies stem from systems thinking. Forrester was 
the first to develop the modeling theory relating to dynamic systems, therefore combining 
the idea of general systems with the concept of complex relationships over time [81]. 
Schwaninger has made a comprehensive effort to summarize all system movement efforts 
since its origins. These all culminate into several categories of systems thinking to fall 
into the positivist tradition and the interpretivist tradition. Schwaninger defines positivist 
as those systems thinking methods that focus on generating systems based on ascertained 
facts. He defines interpretivist as those systems that emphasize the art of defining systems 
and the value of subjective interpretations of phenomena [81]. Together these two 
categories have been combined by Forrester into what is today known as system 
dynamics.   
Historically, several leaders within the system dynamics community have 
proposed a formalized representation of the steps involved in system dynamics modeling, 
which are provided in Table 3. This represents the steps inherent in the process which all 
present a similar methodology. Over the years, the general concepts underlying the 
methodology of system dynamics have gone unchanged. 
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3.4.2 Systems Thinking 
Systems thinking is the first step in utilizing a system dynamics methodology. It 
involves the investigation of interactions within a system [82]. A system begins with the 
clear articulation of system purposes and the basic components that have the largest 
impact in the system. Systems thinking, or mental mapping of a model, is then translated 
to a system dynamics model that can be simulated.  
During model conceptualization, it is important to identify main system variables 
and define variable types. Figure 3 illustrates this principle and shows an example of a 
causal loop diagram. 
 
Figure 3 Causal Loop Diagram Example 
Through constant discussion with the client or subject matter experts, the causal 
structure of a system can be developed. Simplification is of great value in this process; as 
with all models, a degree of generalization is often required. System dynamics does not 
address all of reality, but rather a scoped problem is a better use of the methodology. This 
abstraction is referred to as bounded rationality [83]. When depicting a system with such 
a model, it is important to note that while useful for understanding complex relationships, 
no model is a perfect representation of reality [80]. A system is more than the sum of its 
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parts. Representing a system using a system dynamics model is an iterative process. The 
first step in creating a model is to identify the problem and define objectives followed by 
model conceptualization and then model formulation [84].   
3.4.3 Basic Concepts 
The next portion of developing system dynamics concepts involves model 
formulation and a stock and flow diagram. The most rudimentary roots of a system in 
system dynamics are found in the stocks, flows, and delays that form the system and its 
behavior. These originate from its background in industrial dynamics [85]. A stock in 
system dynamics is an accumulation of “material or information that has built up in a 
system over time” [80]. A flow, also referred to in the literature as a rate, in system 
dynamic is “material or information that enters or leaves a stock over a period of time” 
[80]. 
Figure 4 illustrates a simple example of a stocks and flows. In this example the 
Chinese population is the stock. The flows are the birth and the death rates. Over time the 
Chinese population will increase if deaths are less than births, and it will decrease if the 
opposite is true. 
 
Figure 4 Stocks and Flows Example 
These illustrations offer a visual presentation of differential equations. The double lines 
with the hour glass symbol represent the flow or rate into the stock, represented by a 
Chinese
Population
Births Deaths
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rectangular box. Mathematically this diagram represents the formulation provided in 
Equation 1.  
 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑡) = 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(0) + ∫ (𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑠 − 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
 
(Eq 1) 
where t = time and ChinesePopulation(0) is given as an initial population. The Chinese 
population at time t is dependent on the rate of births and deaths within the system. 
Another way to represent the flow into a stock is shown in Figure 5. Here the value of the 
rate or flow into the stock Chinese Population is represented as a bi-flow labeled “Net 
Births” which can be positive or negative.  
 
Figure 5 Net Flow Example 
Formulation for this is presented 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
(Eq 2) 
𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
(Eq 3) 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑡) = 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(0) + ∫ (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑠)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
 
(Eq 4) 
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where Capacity is a constant set limit and the function f(Crowding) represents a fitted 
function which in this case is monotonically decreasing.  
Modeling relationships between variables is not always inherent or accessible 
based on known formulations or data. Relationships of interacting components typically 
follows one of six fundamental modes of behaviors: exponential growth, goal seeking, s-
shaped growth, oscillation, overshoot and collapse, and growth with overshoot [11]. 
Barlas later expanded on this categorizing additional behavior patterns to those listed in 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 Typical Categories of Basic Dynamic Behavior [86] 
A continuation of the marketing example is illustrated in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Stock and Flow Example 
This figure offers a hypothesized relationship that the number of potential 
supporters within the system may have a positive influence on the prospective change 
flow. The arrowed blue line with the “+” sign represents a relationship within the system. 
In this case, the number of potential supporters influences the rate of perspective change 
which acts as a flow into the stock, actual supporters, in this example. The relationship 
between the effects of potential supporters on the rate of prospective change may be 
unknown; however, even if its type function is unknown, a fitting behavioral relationship 
can be applied to the model using an appropriate growth relationship from Figure 6. 
Following this process, additional key variables impacting the stocks and flows 
should be identified and added to the model. This is illustrated in Figure 8 where key 
contributors to the system are now included. 
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Figure 8 Stock Flow Example with Added Key Variables 
The largest contributors of the system and their corresponding relationships and 
feedback loops within the system should be the result of continued discussion with those 
who understand the system being modeled. Transferring this model to a formulation 
follows this process that then allows for simulation and testing. Simulation of this system 
leads to analysis that can provide insight to policy makers and leadership while 
incorporating the potentially unforeseen effects of interacting variables within a system 
[11]. 
When there is a closed relationship change between stocks, a feedback loop is 
formed [80]. Figure 9 is a representation of a simple feedback loop using stocks and a 
flow to form a system dynamics system. The structure of this feedback loop portray a 
visual representation of the basic components of the Bass diffusion model discussed in 
Section 3.3.1. 
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Figure 9 Feedback Loop System Bass Model Example 
Feedbacks are either reinforcing or balancing depending on the effect of the 
variables on the flow. Together these components create the basis for a system. As seen 
in Figure 9, the feedbacks are all reinforcing as noted by the “+” adjacent to the arrows. 
Multiple stocks, flows, and contributing variables interact, forming relationships that are 
often non-linear.  
3.4.4 Soft Variables 
While system dynamics can be utilized to model quantitative variables, it is also a 
useful tool for modeling qualitative variables. System dynamics is an evolving field with 
the ability to address issues relating to variables that are difficult to measure, although it 
is not always a capability utilized or applicable when solving a specific problem. In 
matters regarding the spread of human rights in China; variables are often difficult to 
measure, or the data is simply not accessible or existent given the sensitivity and 
background of the topic. In operations research, it is far more common that these types of 
variables are in fact omitted due to the lack of data or direct measures with which to 
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represent them [87]. Forrester addressed difficult to measure variables, also referred to as 
“soft” variables, by asserting that “to omit such variables is equivalent to saying that they 
have zero effect - probably the only value that is known to be wrong” [85]. At its 
creation, Forrester purposed system dynamics to radicalize the realm of mathematical 
elegance for elegance sake by surpassing the fabricated constraints of quantitative 
variables [88]. Variables modeled included those that represented hypotheses concerning 
real-world intuition and not necessarily those that were directly calculable or statistically 
able to be fitted like those utilized in standard engineering approaches. Figure 10 
illustrates the concept that most available information that may govern the effect within a 
system is not numerical in nature but rather qualitative. Forrester asserts that the mental 
database provides not only the greatest quantity of information, but it is also of greatest 
significance to modeling the system [12]. 
 
Figure 10 Mental Database Regarding Decreasing Databases Adapted From [89] 
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The orthodox approach to modeling stresses fitting the relationships and data to 
with appropriate exactness and precision. Precision is not the aim of system dynamics, 
but models should be as precise as necessary to fit the research question. Traditional 
approaches may limit insight and prevent the attainment of useful results based on 
simulated constraints. In the 1980’s the spectrum of system dynamics began to expand to 
include purely qualitative models; mental models were created with no simulations [89]. 
The exercise of mapping the influence, also referred to as systems thinking, has been 
shown to be valuable in its own right. 
The distinction between strictly quantifiable and qualitative variables is 
unnecessarily exacting. Wolstenholme [90] conducts an analysis comparing the benefits 
of a systems approach strictly utilizing qualitative techniques to one strictly utilizing 
quantitative techniques and concluded that success requires both approaches. 
Components with direct or proxy measures should be utilized to represent real-world 
application where possible; however, such an approach does not always fit the situation. 
When quantifiable data is not available, conjecture to possible real world measures in 
attempts to quantify values should be avoided [89].  
As with other qualitative oriented modeling approaches used in operations 
research, a standard within the community is necessary to maintain a consistency and 
validity within the approach. Coyle [89] introduces the concepts of “hard” and “soft” 
variables, describing the two categories of quantitative and qualitative variables that 
apply to most systems. The quantitative, or “hard”, variables represent money, people, or 
other easily embodied items with clear units of measure. Qualitative, or “soft”, variables 
represent parts of a system such as effort, customer satisfaction, anger, or other variables 
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that are not easily embodied and do not have obvious unit or metric. Within this research, 
a mixed approach, utilizing both quantifiable and qualitative data, is applied. 
Quantifiable measures tend to be evident in their representation of a variable; 
however, this is not the case with soft variables. Since 1998 several articles have been 
published that outline methods of approach when modeling with soft variables, or that 
apply methods to typically nontraditional realms of system dynamics such as political 
science [89], [91]–[94] . System dynamics is a science in which accurate data should be 
used. But the insights gained from modeling, even with imprecise data, do have value and 
provide a valid contribution. The methodology suggested for developing soft variables is 
key to maintaining the standard required to utilize system dynamics to its true potential 
[91], [94], [95]. The stages described in Table 4 represent a systematic approach for 
constructing soft variables [92]. 
 
Table 4 Soft Variable Construction Stages Adapted from Hayward et al. [92] 
  Stage Questions 
1 Scale Does the soft variable have a minimum or maximum value? 
2 Units Are there any suggested units of measure for the soft variable? 
3 Nature Is the soft variable a stock, converter, or flow? 
4 Inputs What outside elements have an effect on the soft variable? 
5 Outputs What outside elements does the soft variable affect? 
 
Following the identification of a soft variable, the identification of interactions 
that exist with other components is required. Table 5 is transcribed from Hayward’s et al. 
[92] efforts in creating a standard for soft variable implementation. 
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Table 5 Soft Variable Use Considerations Adapted from Hayward et al.[92] 
  Consideration Questions 
1 Effect How many different model elements does the soft variable affect? 
2 Combination 
How are different soft variable effects combined before they influence 
another element? 
 
The second consideration concerning the identification of soft variables addresses 
multiple variable interactions suggesting that groupings of variables should be simple. 
Based on Hayward’s et al. research [92] following previously studied cognitive algebra 
and the typical linear and non-linear combinations proposed by Sterman [11], the 
different combinations of variables can be formulated as indicated by Table 6 [92]. It 
assumes that soft variable x and y lie within a scale of 0 < x, y < 1.  
Table 6 Combination of Soft Variable Effects Adapted from Hayward et al. 
Description Formula 
Strict 𝑥𝑦 
Strict Compromise √𝑥𝑦 
Lenient Compromise 
𝑥 + 𝑦
2
 
Lenient 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑥𝑦 
 
 Hayward et al. [92] summarizes efforts to standardize soft variable application 
within system dynamics models. An example of incorporating a soft variable utilizing 
this method is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 Basic Soft Variable Incorporation 
This expands on the variable of crowding introduced in Figure 5 and separates the 
variable and its effect. Here the crowding variable can be modeled perhaps to have a 
value between 0 and 1 and this value can then be used in combination with its 
hypothesized effect to impact the flow. The hypothesized effect for crowding on the rate 
of births is that it is likely to cause growth and therefore a growth relationship, as 
depicted in Figure 6, is modeled.  
3.4.4 Goal Dynamics 
In addition to the use of soft variables, social modeling often requires the use of 
goal setting. There is typically a desired state within a system that the system aims to 
adapt to. For example, when one sets a thermostat, that could represent the desired 
temperature within the system. The heat flow used to change the temperature within the 
system may aim to meet this desired goal. A loop diagram of this process is offered in  
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Figure 12 Causal Goal Dynamic Illustration 
This causal goal structure can then be translated to a system dynamics presentation as 
shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 Simple Goal Dynamics Example 
Goal setting is a foundational element in modeling social behaviors. To create a 
model more representative of reality, one should incorporate eroding goals. An eroding 
goal essentially represents the desired state of the system as a changing function based on 
endogenous variables rather than exogenous variables. This means that the goal changes 
based on the circumstances present within the system and is not a constant set outside of 
the simulation. This goal setting can occur in several forms, Barlas recommends several 
State of the
System
DiscrepancyCorrective Action
Desired State of
the System
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strategies to best utilize this technique [96]. An example of a further expanded goal 
system within system dynamics is presented in Figure 14. 
  
 
Figure 14 Model of Eroding Goal Dynamics 
Modeling goals as eroding goals rather than strict exogenous goals allows for 
circumstances within the system to effect the goal. Within this system, the previously 
exogenous goal has now become an implicit goal endogenous to the system.  
3.4.5 Model Validation 
System dynamics considers dynamic behaviors of a system providing insight 
accounting for results affected by delays and feedbacks within a system. For topics 
regarding social or behavioral sciences, this method allows for an integrative means to 
comprehend them [79]. The greatest criticism of system dynamics appears in its lack of 
precision. This shift from detailed quantitative analysis towards qualitative analysis is 
noted not only by Forester, but it is a distinguishing feature for the field; successors, such 
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as Coyle, make mention that this is one of its greatest contributions [89]. Its greatest 
criticism, however, is seen by some as one of its strength in allowing for the modeling of 
topics which lend themselves to non-quantitative studies. 
A large and partially still unaddressed criticism of system dynamics 
methodologies finds itself linked to this imprecision in that field appears to have a lack of 
formal validation approaches when compared to more traditional discrete simulation 
validation and verification methods. However, progress in this area continues, and in the 
next section several attempted approaches to validate system dynamics models are 
discussed. 
Forrester and Senge wrote on this issue in 1980 suggesting several tests to use as 
guidelines when creating models [97]. Sterman later expanded upon this by attempting to 
provide a more organized approach at model validation. Sterman writes that  
system dynamics is a perspective and set of conceptual tools that enable us to 
understand the structure and dynamics of complex system. System dynamics is 
also a rigorous modeling method that enables us to build formal computer 
simulations of complex system and use them to design more effective policies and  
organizations [11].  
Coyle has argued that there may not be additional value to the actual simulation of 
models but, rather, mapping out the understanding of a complex network of relationships 
with the feedback loops may be enough [95]. The insight given in depicting the system 
may be sufficient to answer critical questions depending on the problem being modeled. 
Gaining an intimate understanding of a system throughout the modeling process is 
necessary in order to simply complete a system dynamics model. After an initial model is 
created, the question then arises as to how to determine the validity of the model: is the 
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model good enough? The utility of the model may speak to answering that question 
somewhat; however there have been attempts at more rigorous approaches. 
One such approach that has stood the test of time was suggested in 1994 by 
Yarman Barlas [98]. Barlas summarizes system dynamics model validation methods into 
several categories: Direct Structure Tests (of two types Empirical and Theoretical), 
Structure-oriented Behavior tests, and Behavior Pattern Tests. His suggestion is that each 
of these tests is required in a logical sequence in order to receive the mark of being valid. 
This appears to be a very thorough approach, but may be impractical in some operational 
cases. Although adjustments to ensure meeting standard are desired, they can become a 
frivolity in that the additional insight gained from a standard of this rigor may not 
typically be worth the effort [99]. As with all modeling, precision must be balanced 
against the accuracy of the answer required, the potential cost of an error, and the 
practical consideration (time, cost) of more detailed modeling. 
Shrekengost takes a more relaxed approach, valuing the usefulness of the model 
over its adherence to a high rigor to pass validity [100]. Still, it appears there are 
guidelines for structural and behavioral validity even justified by those who hold his 
opinion. Shrekengost suggests several more structured techniques in order to assist in 
gaining confidence for a system dynamics model and its ability to meet the purpose of its 
design.  
Each factor considered must not only be meaningful but also must correspond to a 
component in the real world [11]. In cases when concepts are abstract and precise 
measures are not possible, the purpose of the system can still be achieved. Results from 
modeling and simulation using these techniques do not produce precise results. 
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Reasonable validation techniques steer away from precise parameterization and design. 
Face validity, referring to the degree to which the model appears effective in terms of its 
stated aims, includes comparing the similarity between the system modeled and reality. 
Comparing real world behavior patterns with historical behaviors allows some confidence 
to be gained in the system. 
The greatest difficulty with validating a system dynamics model is that the 
purpose of using this method is not precision in the first place. When considering basing 
a model on the premises of analyzing policy and exploring diverse scenarios, structural 
validity testing is suggested so that the model might be judged valid [101].  
Given the goal of system dynamics, it is difficult to test for precision and validity 
in this manner. For that reason, avoiding sweeping claims based on results is suggested 
[79]. The imprecisions inherent in the method lends itself better to conservative qualified 
presentation of any conclusions found from simulation results. The clearest guideline 
found in the current literature appears to be that of using empirical testing to validate 
results as best as possible, following the sanity check of the initial usefulness of the 
model. Peer review and expert opinions can provide another check and will increase the 
credibility of the model as it is accepted in the community for which the system is 
intended. The test of time will be the surest tool for capitalizing the most useful criticisms 
and creating a useful system model for the problem at hand. Since elapsed time is not 
initially available, a more systematic approach is applied to test this initial research. 
While there are several examples of those attempting to address validation of 
system dynamics models, few achieve the level of organization that Zagonel and Corbet 
[102] do in their methodical approach of categorized the majority of system dynamics 
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validation techniques found in the available literature. Their efforts resulted in 
categorizing validation systematically into five portions as seen in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15 Assessment of System Dynamics Models [102]  
These methods for assessment are rooted in Forrester and Senge’s and Sterman’s 
guidelines [11], [97]. This research addresses model validation in respect to suggested 
methods from Figure 15. While there are twenty-four tests mentioned, each test does not 
apply to every system dynamics model. Rather, for the purposes of this research, at least 
one test from each component found is addressed. For an expanded view of questions 
addressed within each test listed, refer to Appendix B. 
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3.5 Summary 
System dynamics appears to be an apt choice in tools to better understand and 
evaluate the potential effectiveness of policy decisions of the United States-with regard to 
human rights in China. It allows for an understanding of complex and potentially non-
intuitive effects while predicting general relationship impacts given varying policy 
decisions. This aligns well with the purposes of system dynamics and its applicability to 
many systems. The system used for this pilot model has been created based on guidelines 
gleaned through the writings of many experts. 
This chapter discussed relevant theories foundational to the modeling 
methodologies applied in Chapters 4 and 5. This includes concepts of social movement 
theory that present a hypothesis for causes leading to government reformation. The 
concepts of diffusion models as applied to the spread of ideas were discussed portraying 
the use of a modified Bass diffusion model that is applied within the framework of this 
system. Also discussed is the approach of system dynamics and its specific application to 
predicting policy effectiveness. This discussion summarized the application of systems 
dynamics to qualitative problems, as well as a community standard for methods to utilize 
soft variables and apply goal dynamics within the model. These topics summarize the 
basis for the constructed system that models the spread of human rights within China. 
The methodology applying these theories to construct a system is discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
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IV General Methodology 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the steps taken to follow traditional system 
dynamics approaches. Utilizing the steps defined in Chapter 3, Table 3, the following list 
of steps is adapted from conventional representations of systems dynamics methodology: 
1. Problem Articulation 
2. Model Formulation 
3. Testing 
4. Policy Design 
5. Policy Evaluation 
This chapter covers steps 1, 2 and 4 on this list. Problem definition, a high-level model 
overview, and suggested solutions via policy design are discussed. Chapter 5 discusses a 
more detailed formulation of each model component as a part of step two. Steps three and 
five are addressed in Chapter 6. 
4.2 Problem Articulation  
The literature review in Chapter 2 outlines the problem formulation. A summary 
of the discussion in Chapter 2 is provided here: According to Freedom House measures, 
China is considered “Not Free” with a rating of 6 for social freedoms and 7 for political 
rights on a scale of 1 (“Free”) to 7 (“Not Free”). A non-democratic status for a nation 
state with the size and global influence of China represents significantly higher statistical 
risk of conventional and/or nonconventional warfare with the Unites States than a 
democratic status would according to democratic peace theory.  However, despite some 
predictions that China would become more democratic after the opening of economic 
barriers in 1970, China has remained at a level of 6 or higher on both Freedom House 
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scales since 1960. Instead of fostering the growth of human rights and democracy within 
China, the economic benefits have instead dramatically increased the overall power and 
influence of a government that is no more democratic than before the economic reforms. 
For example, the current Chinese president appears to be trending further away from civil 
liberties. The current political system, as is, does not appear to become more democratic 
without additional measures taken by outside forces. The problem formulation is 
therefore: China appears to remain perpetually undemocratic without additional input for 
transformation. A significant reflection of real transformation and progress in the growth 
of democratic ideology within China would be increased human rights, which are a 
primary focus in the Freedom House scale. The model has therefore been designed to 
represent a self-contained system of variables that influence human rights within China 
utilizing the impacts of eroding goals as circumstances change over time. 
4.3 Model Formulation Overview 
4.3.1 Overarching Components 
The overarching base model resulting from this approach is large and somewhat 
difficult to fathom when first observed. The model is therefore subdivided into several 
components with collective themes for easier comprehension. These components are 
addressed in turn. The sections are: 
 A: Condition State 
 B: Government Perceptions 
 C: Government Actions 
 D: Information Access 
 E: Citizen Perceptions 
 F: Citizen Actions 
 G: Population Sentiment 
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Together these sections form the feedback loops of a dynamic system. Figure 16 provides 
an overview of how the components relate and interact to each other in the system. Each 
arrow may represent multiple interactions. 
 
 
Figure 16 Base Model Component Overview and Interactions 
Figure 16 identifies the key elements within the process. The chief purpose of this 
research is to investigate how to most effectively influence the condition of human rights 
within China. This is represented in component A. The Chinese government holds the 
power to act and change these desired conditions in a peaceful transition from the status 
quo. Their role in the process is depicted in components B and C of the model. Next, the 
citizens represent a key actor to this process and their efforts in a potential social 
movement creating change. Their role is depicted in components E and F of the model. 
Components D and G of the model depict additional key parts of the system: the current 
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state of sentiment within China (meaning the support for a social movement regarding 
human rights) and Information. 
A detailed view of the model in its entirety, with all relationships, is shown in 
Appendix C. Chapter 5 discusses component formulation in more detail. This model does 
not account for all possible interactions or all possible components effecting the modeled 
relationship. However, the model represents the components deemed pertinent and most 
influential in regards to the research objective to understand what best effects the spread 
of human rights within China based on input from the literature as well as discussion with 
subject matter experts. This modeling process is an incremental process that adapts as 
mental models adjust to better represent reality. 
4.3.2 Competing Goals 
Competing goals are posited as the key mechanisms acting to influence human 
rights within China. These goals are framed in relation to specific desired conditions of 
human rights within China. The goals are each measured using the Freedom House scale 
with values from one to seven. For example, a goal value of 1 represents a desired 
condition state that aligns itself with the value of 1 on the Freedom House scale which 
indicates a “Free” state. The identified competing goals are shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 Competing Goals 
Government perspective represents the government in China (the CCP) and their desires. 
The status quo refers to the tendency towards tradition of systems. The authoritarian 
structure represents the basis of the government system constructs. Social movement 
goals represent the desires of a social movement leading to greater human rights. Finally, 
relative deprivation represents the desires caused by the emergence of a social movement 
accounting for those who may not support the movement but are discontent with their 
current condition. A list view of these goals and their associated values is shown in Table 
7. 
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Table 7 Competing Goal Values 
Type Competing Goal Value 
Exogenous Structure (Authoritarian) 7 
Endogenous Status Quo Based on past values 
Endogenous Government Perspective Function of competing goals 
Endogenous Relative Deprivation Function of global awareness 
Exogenous Social Movement 1 
 
The functions alluded to in Table 7 are further discussed in Chapter 5 within the 
formulation of the component that contains the goal. 
4.3.3 Simulation Settings 
System dynamics methodology states that one should set a horizon of simulation 
time appropriate to the problem. The general settings of the system simulated within the 
model is in time steps of one year from 2010 to 2040. Given the limited amount of open 
source data over each component, one year is the lowest denominator used in this pilot 
model. Future research integrating more detailed information that may become available 
would provide a higher level of fidelity in the model. Prolonged extrapolation or 
forecasting often misleads,; to avoid this thirty years has been used as a run period. Of 
course if one felt a social movement to alter China might take a longer time and sufficient 
confidence in date to predict a longer horizon were available, a longer horizon could be 
used. For this initial modeling attempt, a thirty year horizon seemed justified to 
demonstrate policy efficacy within the model. This presents a sufficient time span to 
provide understanding of the relationship effects that are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Additionally, the hypotheses presented to support the modeled relationships between the 
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components of the system are based on data and literature from recent years, therefore 
beginning the run period several years prior to the current date allows for a comparison of 
the modeled system to reality. Once a base model is constructed and simulates the 
problem of interest, policy design in order to implement improvements are constructed. 
4.4 Policy Design 
United States policy implementation regarding human rights in China has 
succeeded in single event instances in the past. This suggests strong substantiation of the 
possibility that further efforts within China could have positive long term effects and 
influence the system. The base model simulates the current condition within China. 
Policy strategies are developed based on options for various United States initiative. 
These strategies influence the base model to differing degrees within varying parts of the 
simulations. While these strategies were derived from United States stated policy actions 
regarding human rights in China, the efforts represent potential influences on the system 
that can be enacted by any force. These strategies are presented as exogenous variables 
within the system.  
4.4.1 Background for United States Policy and Actions 
The policy options that the United States is actively employing in its efforts to 
promote human rights within China according to reports provided to Congress [18] 
include the following list: 
 Open criticism of PRC human rights policies and practices 
 Quiet diplomacy 
 Hearings 
 Foreign assistance programs 
 Sanctions 
 Coordination of international pressure 
 Public diplomacy 
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 Bilateral dialogue 
 Support for dissident and pro-democracy groups in China and the United 
States 
 Internet freedom efforts 
These are captured within the model by grouping them into several root policy types:  
 Policy 1: Top-down approach: Messages directed towards placing pressure on the 
Chinese government such as sanctions, open criticism of human rights policies 
and practices, international pressure. 
 Policy 2: Bottom-up approach: Messages directed towards informing Chinese 
citizens such as Voice of America in China 
 Policy 3: Grassroots approach: Facilitating free information access within China 
such as internet freedom, support for dissident and pro-democracy groups within 
China 
These three root policy strategies form the base three variables for level of effort the 
United States can act upon in order to effect change within the system.  
4.4.2 Measure of United States Policy and Actions Variables 
Policy strategies are assumed unaffected by any other portion of the system – 
these are defined as exogenous variables and are used for policy analysis discussed in 
Chapter 6. Base model validation excludes these variables by setting values to 0. Each 
variable represents a soft variable attempting to capture the areas of impact that each 
policy strategy would utilize. They represents the level of effort the United States might 
promote towards achieving democratic ideals within each relative approach. 1 represents 
maximum efforts, meaning some general capacity at efforts extended to effect the system 
while 0 represents no effort.  
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Data is currently not accessible, or potentially existent, to measure the direct 
impact of each approach. A potential measure for each value comes in the form of United 
States dollars spent for budget sections. For the top-down approach, United States dollars 
spent on development assistance could be utilized as a proxy measure of equivalence. 
The bottom-up efforts could be approximated to United States dollars spent on the 
democracy fund. As discussed in Chapter 2, democracy is represented in the measures of 
freedoms of human rights and therefore promoting democracy specifically does effect 
and influence these outcomes. The current aid that the United States is providing to 
promote democracy in China is viewed as a threat against the regime [103]. Grassroots 
efforts could be approximated to United States dollars spent on internet freedom. 
Due to the sensitivity of this topic, and difficulty of access to data within China, 
the recommendations of this study are not suited for dollars as a quantification amount. 
These measures require a quantifiable impact in proxy measurements in order to 
incorporate this level of fidelity. The results should be used as an indicator of which 
strategy has the potential largest impact in effecting the system. These considerations in 
policy analysis testing results are further discussed in Chapter 6.  
4.4.3 Policy Strategy System Impact 
Policy 1, top-down efforts, impact the external pressure directed towards 
persuading the government at a leadership level. Policy 2, bottom-up efforts, impact the 
system by attempting to persuade citizens thereby increasing the flow from those who 
oppose a social movement to those who support a social movement for human rights. 
Policy 3, grassroots efforts, impacts the system by increasing accessibility to information 
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and helps to facilitate an environment for a movement to grow by circumventing 
restrictive structure within the system. Table 8 depicts the strategies postulated.  
Table 8 Strategy Variables 
Stock Variables 
Min Max Unit Label Description Source 
0 1 - 
Policy1: 
Top-down Efforts 
Efforts aimed at persuading the Chinese 
government, placing external pressure 
on the government actions 
[18] 
0 1 - 
Policy 2: 
Bottom-up Efforts 
Efforts aimed at persuading Chinese 
Citizens to support a movement 
[18] 
0 1 - 
Policy 3: 
Grassroots Efforts 
Efforts aimed at facilitating a social 
movements ability to succeed 
[18] 
 
While United States policy strategy impacts are intended to represent the efforts 
of different policy actions available to the United States, these could be translated to 
efforts by any organization. Additional organizations or nations may concurrently 
provide input into the external pressure component, however, they are not considered 
within the scope of this initial model. These policies are implemented on a base system 
which is discussed for the remainder of this chapter. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the general methodology and construction 
of the model used to address the research objective. Chapter 5 provides further details for 
the construction of the underlying components used in the formulation of a pilot model. 
Without a template for this particular model, a wide array of research covering the 
expansive amount of theory related to component formulations comprises a principal 
portion of discussion in Chapter 5.  
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V Component Formulation 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a more detailed discussion as to the formulation of each 
component within the model. Displays of model components will represent a simplified 
version of stock variables, their rates, and inter-component interactions distinguished by 
colored arrows. Full representation of variables within each component is provided in 
detail in Appendix D. 
The remainder of this chapter addresses each component constructed within the 
model. Each variable contained within each component is discussed and the measure 
used to represent each stock variable defined. The relationships between variables are 
ascertained based on research relevant to the relationships. When specific data is not 
available, a hypothesized relationship is estimated and a coefficient of effect applied 
within the model. All variables contained within the model represent a theory or social 
hypotheses observed within literature; however, there is not a direct measure for each 
variable. For variables without direct measures when effects are known to exist the 
relationship is postulated based on the literature review. These are discussed within each 
section and measure description paragraphs are fully indented for clear separation of 
topic type. It is recommended in Chapter 7 that further research be conducted to 
investigate the quantitative nature of relationships between variables and to utilize proxy 
measures for each variable when direct data is not available. 
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5.2 Model Component A: Condition State within China 
This portion of the model summarizes the current condition within the system in 
relation to the variables identified as pertinent in the emergence of civil discontent. The 
purpose of the model is to influence change within the human rights variables within this 
component. Figure 18 depicts the stock variables measured and the components that 
interact with these variables. The status quo goal is rooted in this component. The status 
quo refers to the tendency of a system to remain as it is [96]. The status quo goal value of 
human rights is set based on a delay value of what the human rights conditions were the 
year prior. 
 
Figure 18 Component A 
5.2.1 Background for Component A 
Using relative deprivation theory, the hypothesized factors leading to a movement 
for human rights within China begin with social unrest [104]. Social unrest is rooted in 
certain conditions within China: economic growth rate, condition of political rights, and 
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condition of social freedoms based on the understood legitimacy constructs of the 
government.  
To account for both the importance of economic condition in legitimizing the 
system of government in place and the theory of relative deprivation, the economic 
growth rate is presented as a measurement for economic status. This accounts for the 
circumstance that although the growth rate and GDP of China may be positive, if the rate 
of growth decreases between years, then social unrest is hypothesized to increase [62]. 
Future research may represent GDP as an endogenous variable with additional non-
constant rates or inputs, however, within the scope of this model the impact of a social 
movement on the economy is not considered.  
Additional forecasts of the GDP growth rate have been studied but were not 
adapted for use within the scope of this model [105], [106]. Future considerations may 
consider other measures of the economic situation in China to incorporate unemployment 
or other hypothesized instigators of social unrest. 
5.2.2 Measure of Component A Variables 
Condition Level Social Freedoms and Political Rights 
These stocks are based on the one to seven Freedom house scale. The reference 
conditions for both social freedoms and political rights are initialized at the 
historical values available from Freedom House. These conditions receive input 
from the actions of the Chinese government. If there is a discrepancy between the 
current state and the actions of the government, the conditions may be effectively 
changed by up to 1 value on the Freedom House scale. If Chinese government 
actions with respect to the political rights or social freedoms are at a lower value 
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than the current condition (on the Freedom House scale), then the probability of 
the condition changing is based on the percentage of citizens in China who 
support a movement toward democratic ideal. This line of thinking references the 
evidence presented in the literature observing that the government appears 
responsive to public sentiment and lasting change is dependent on the momentum 
of support. The same logic applies if the actions are at a higher value. The 
probability of the condition changing is based on the percentage of citizens in 
China who oppose and those who do not support, a movement of democratic 
ideals.  
Condition Economic Growth Rate 
Economic growth rate is a percentage that may be positive or negative. This stock 
is measured as a percentage value of GDP growth rate. Worldbank data indicates 
a GDP growth rate of 10.64% in 2010 which is used as initial data input for the 
model [107]. Additionally a trend line fitting historical growth rates over the 
period of 2010-2016 was used to determine a rate of -.26% per year of growth and 
is incorporated in the model as an exogenous variable. The regression is presented 
as a function of time in Appendix D. 
5.3 Model Component B: Chinese Government Perception 
 This portion of the model summarizes the government perception of current 
condition as well as their mentality on what human rights status should be. These 
perceptions then influence their reaction which leads to actions captured within 
component C of the model. Figure 19 exhibits the component interactions with the stock 
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variables of component B. Orange boxes represent stock variables, dotted arrows 
represent interactions from other components, and solid lines represent interactions 
within the component.  
 
Figure 19 Component B 
5.3.1 Background for Component B 
The “China model” is a term used to describe the economic freedom combined 
with political and social repression currently in place as a government model in China. A 
non-westernized form of democracy has been on the political reform agenda within China 
[41], [108], which speaks to government adaptability. The government perception of 
conditions and pressures, either from outside actors such as the United States government 
or from its citizens is represented in component B along with its adaptability in 
responsiveness to try to meet its citizen’s desires.  
An emergent area of research explores the responsiveness of authoritarian regimes 
to societal pressures. China employs a method of selective tolerance. Public protest and 
activism are key indicators informing the government of public opinions, however at a 
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certain point civil action may rise to a level as to lead to actual instability. Additionally, 
given the amount of perceived control, the government maintains the ability to shape 
public opinion through their control of information while also quelling discontent by 
responding to public activists [109]. Furthermore, relative deprivation theory posits that 
internal pressure, when accumulated, can lead to significant societal and cultural change 
such as a shift in regime or circumstance [104].  
The government evolves and reforms, it does not simply shape citizens to 
conform to its way of thinking [110]. This is evidenced by the stark transformation of 
economic policies since 1970 that have enabled China to rise in stature in the global 
community. The goals of the government and policy makers within China are not 
necessarily equal to the reality of circumstances within its borders. The mentality is a 
reference used to determine actions which adjust to the circumstances within the system.  
A study within China asserts that in addition to internal pressure directed by 
political actions of citizens, there is also an element of preemptively responding to 
potential actions [111]. This may be because of how legitimacy is conceived in an 
authoritarian government and due to this fact there tends to be a paranoia motivating the 
government to meet people’s demands [111]. “Successful authoritarian states must be 
willing to respond to public pressure through policy adaptation while also retaining the 
capacity to shape public opinion” [109].  
There is also merit to an argument for external engagement based on historical 
incidents providing evidence for long term change as a result of engagement [112]. The 
external pressures appear mainly in the form of government-level confrontation.  
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5.3.2 Measure of Component B Variables 
Internal pressure 
This stock is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 utilizing a soft variable measure 
approach. Internal pressure incorporates citizen actions from Component F. These 
inputs represent a relationship based on research conducted by Chinese experts as 
well as additional studies linking networking messages to influencing the Chinese 
government [68], [109]. Popular protests and civil action are tools used to 
influence specific policy decisions and provide one such input [109]. No internal 
pressure is represented as 0, a society that completely conforms to the current 
conditions of human rights. One represents a high level of civil unrest measured 
by efforts for social movement in the form of messaging, organization, and 
protests.  
 It is also hypothesized that the government has a tolerance for civil activism that 
represents the norm. This is because civil activism provides vital information that 
the government needs to understand the condition of its nation and maintain its 
legitimacy [109]. 
External pressure 
This stock represents pressure from external groups or states to China [18]. 
Within this model it is used to represent policy efforts directed towards 
persuading the Chinese government to act in a manner consistent with a more 
“free” nation on the Freedom House scale. In reality, many influences may 
persuade government actions and these exist consistently through time. For the 
purposes of modeling, external pressure is set to 0 in the base model and it is 
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utilized in policy analysis. This then creates a system that any policy strategies 
tested represent efforts greater than ones currently existing thereby increasing the 
pressure on the system. 
External pressure is measured as a soft variable in which value of 0 represents no 
additional pressure or efforts present from external entities of the system.  
Government Perceived Control 
This stock represents the threat level that the government perceives. The greater 
the perceived threat, the more likely the government is to act in a repressive 
manner as opposed to a responsive manner. This is measured as a soft variable 
where a value of 0 represents no control, or a high threat level, and 1 represents 
total control or a low threat level. The input into the flow is based on the percent 
of information the government intends to control as compared to the actual 
information that is controlled. A discrepancy arises as citizens act to circumvent 
government controls within the system.  
Government Desired Level of Social Freedom and Political Rights 
These stock variables represent the goal that the government has in relation to 
human rights. Each goal is measured utilizing the Freedom House measure which 
sets a value of 1 to full democratic freedom and a value of 7 to restricted 
authoritarian rule. The goals of the government are a function of other goals 
within the system. 
o Structure- the tendency of the system structure of an authoritarian 
government [33]  
o Status Quo – the tendency of a system to remain in its current state [96] 
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o Social Movement – the impact that a rising social movement for human 
rights can cause [61] 
The hypothesized effects of each goal on the government’s goal level are based 
on the literature and weighted by endogenous values in the system. This is shown 
in Figure 20. These weights are normalized within the system so the resulting 
weights of the three competing goals sum to 1. 
 
Figure 20 Government Goal Function 
5.4 Model Component C: Chinese Government Actions 
This portion of the model summarizes the government actions based on their 
goals of a desired human rights condition from component B. The time unit of the model 
simulation is in years, therefore a constraint to the system is that actions by the 
government are assumed constant throughout the year. While a smaller unit of time 
would be more useful in analyzing this system, the data was not currently available to this 
effect to make such fidelity possible. Figure 21 depicts the key stock variables 
distinguished by dark orange boxes as well as the interacting component effecting the 
flow of change. 
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Figure 21 Component C 
5.4.1 Background for Component C 
As previously discussed, responsiveness in authoritarian regimes can be linked to 
regime legitimacy. Policy makers are likely to rely on a mix of responsive, persuasive, 
and repressive actions [109]. These are based on their perceived level of control and 
perceived threat level. If actions by the public appear to undermine the regime and cause 
instability then it is likely to spur repressive actions.  
The government does tolerate a percentage of objective reporting however the 
underlying message aligns directly with government views. Messaging by the 
government has an impact on shaping public opinion as evidenced by Chinese-Japanese 
public opinion since 2000 [109]. Propaganda promoting the government desired message 
is an integral part of the media and no news outside of what the government permits is 
officially reported without consequence. Even if news is not censored by the CCP 
policing system, it is likely effected by the “soft power” of the CCP perspective [113].  
When discontent is high, this indicates low government control of citizens and in 
such circumstances it is less likely for the Chinese government to permit objective 
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reporting or information [114]. This is denoted by a proxy level of proportion 
representing access to objective reporting that government permits in media based 
directly on the CCP perceived level of control. Freedom House has a rating that scales 
freedom of the press from 0 to 100 with 100 being the worst. China’s press freedom 
status has been rated at or above 84 from 2010-2017 [115]. This value is higher than 
those seen in the early 2000s using the same Freedom House evaluations thus indicating a 
trend towards less freedom. Any message reported within the country must remain 
consistent with government policy. News organizations that are allowed objective content 
in their publishing must do so within the limits of tolerance that the government permits 
[116]. Such messaging is an action that effects the population sentiment, component G of 
the model as well as the information component, component D. 
5.4.2 Measure of Component C Variables 
Government Action Levels of Social Freedoms and Political Rights 
The government actions for social freedoms and political rights are rooted 
in their respective goal levels desired by the government. These values are 
adjusted to accommodate which type of action the government engages with, 
repressive or responsive. The values of these leanings do not exceed the limits of 
the Freedom House scale. No actions are fixed at the same level as government 
goals in order to represent a government that is constantly adapting and reacting 
to conditions. The input to determine whether an action is repressive or 
responsive is based on external pressure and perceived level of control. An 
assumption of the model is that once a government determines to be responsive or 
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repressive, this is consistent at the same increment for both social freedoms and 
political rights actions. 
Based on the methodology of Freedom House measures, it is unlikely that 
a country rated at 7 will produce actions cohesive with that of one rated a 1 on the 
Freedom House scale in the passage of a single year [33]. This is accounted for in 
the model by limiting adjustments of the actions to within 2 values (on the 
Freedom House scale) of the desired government mentality for each year. While 
the selection of [-2, 2] as a range appears reasonable, an investigation of the 
sensitivity to the values of the limit of adjustment from the norm are suggested in 
future research.  
Government Enforced % Information Control 
Government enforced control is a stock variable representing the tolerance the 
government has for objective information [114]. This value is initialized at 84% 
to represent the freedom of internet score based on Freedom House scores [115]. 
The subsequent values are based upon the average action level of the government 
with a hypothesized behavior that the higher the action levels the higher the 
enforced % information control.  
An example of this logic flow is that the government perceives low control based 
upon the amount of content that citizen’s access that is outside of their desired message. 
This low control leads to an increase in likelihood of repressive rather than responsive 
actions. The government then decides to repress and therefore the level that is acted upon 
within the social freedoms and political rights and messaging actions available to the 
government is up to 2 values higher on the Freedom House scale than the government’s 
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actual goal for the desired levels. This represents an oscillating adjustment in dynamic 
goal setting as the government attempts to effect conditions to meet its desired level of 
control. These actions then are translated to a high enforced percentage of information 
control.  
5.5 Model Component D: Information 
Arguably, this component finds itself at the root of all change. Information is at 
the core of any social movement maintaining its course and leading to creating a lasting 
transformation within a nation. It is required to organize, it is required to share ideas, it is 
required to perceive conditions and it is required for awareness. Vital to the ability of a 
movement spreading is the ability for citizens to communicate the purpose and 
motivation surrounding the movement [117]. A movement does not gain momentum 
without communication and transparency. Additionally, access to information allows 
citizens to evaluate their circumstances on a global level which may lead to increased 
action and demands for human rights.  
This component includes how citizens within China access information, the 
government control over the information, and the government limitations set on the 
mechanisms required of a social movement which are considered the ability to express 
opinions and the ability to organize. The simplified information access portion of the 
model is displayed in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22 Component D 
5.5.1 Background for Component D 
How Chinese Citizens Access Information 
eMarketer, a leading research firm for marketing in a digital world according to 
Business Insider [118], has conducted research estimating the amount of time adults in 
China engage in the major mediums of media [119]. This is separated into time spent on 
each medium and is displayed as a percentage of the total time spent from 2012-2017 as 
shown in Table 9. Given that the model simulation begins in 2010, these numbers are 
extrapolated to estimate earlier date values based on time and the percentages shown in 
Table 9.  
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Table 9: % Time Spent with Media Medium in China According to eMarketer Data 
 
Within this model, linear equations are built to extrapolate the percent of media 
consumed based on mediums using data from Table 9 and the time in years as an input. 
These regressions are shown in Appendix D. Although it may be reasonable to estimate 
that there is an upper level of media consumed, simple regression equations were 
developed given the scope of this model. An additional assumption of the model is that 
these percentages are indicative of the news sources the average Chinese citizen engages 
with and uses as their source of news.  
News, as opposed to non-specific entertainment information, is vital to a social 
movement because it informs citizens of the condition of their situation and 
circumstances within their own borders. Globally, objective news provides Chinese 
citizens a reference of their relative status compared to the status of those outside of their 
borders. While entertainment media may also provide Westernized influences in the 
media realm which could promote democratic ideals passively, an ideal proxy measure of 
how well citizens are informed is their engagement with news sources. Other studies 
investigating the interaction of Chinese citizens with different news mediums and the 
Type 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Digital 40.4% 45.3% 48.0% 49.4% 50.7% 52.0%
Mobile 21.0% 26.6% 29.8% 32.4% 34.0% 35.7%
Desktop/Laptop 19.4% 18.6% 18.2% 17.3% 16.7% 16.1%
Television 51.6% 47.9% 45.7% 44.7% 43.6% 42.4%
Radio 3.5% 3.3% 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 2.9%
Print 4.5% 3.6% 3.1% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7%
Newspaper 3.8% 3.3% 2.8% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4%
Magazines 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Year
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percentage of news they engage in exist, however, none appeared as comprehensive as 
the information displayed in Table 9. 
Furthermore, worth considering in future efforts is the credibility that citizens 
apply to news sources. Citizens tend to place different levels of legitimacy depending on 
whether news is from official sources or spread by citizens [120]. 
Chinese Government Disseminated Information/ Great Firewall and Censorship 
The Chinese government controls official media within China and biases 
messages to suit regime priorities. In addition to biasing news and information consumed 
by Chinese citizens, the government also has a state of the art censorship tool at its 
disposal to block unwanted messages from being propagated. This is known as the Great 
Firewall of China. Contrary to much popular research and articles, the purpose behind the 
strict censorship within China does not appear to be censoring government or leadership 
criticism but rather it appears to focus on limiting collective action of the citizens [116]. 
This may be because criticism of leadership or the government is an outlet that allows 
citizens to express views without any further impact whereas preventing groups from 
forming to action has seen greater benefit for the government. A study conducted by the 
Congressional Executive Commission on China notes that the government tends to 
permit a level of criticism from elite members of society in government controlled 
forums [121].  
 The ability to organize and the ability to express opinions are key components 
within a movement [63]. They represent a flow of information to pass between citizens 
and impact the extent to which the citizens are able to do actions corresponding to the 
four stages of social movements. These abilities are regulated by government enforced 
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control: the less control the government perceives, they believe that greater threat exists 
and therefore the less ability to organize.  
External Information Sources 
Two areas within the literature review revealed options for circumventing Chinese 
government controlled information: Radio Free Asia/Voice of America and VPN access. 
Although additional options exist and the structure within the model can account for 
television and print considerations, they were not included within the scope of this 
research.  
Radio Free Asia and Voice of America operations in China are both avenues of 
spreading uncensored information to the people within China [54]. Radio listeners within 
China were reported at only .03% of the total population within China for these programs 
in 2009 [122] and 2014 [123]. Radio is seeing a decline in relevance in the age of new 
technologies. While these have been credible sources for truthful news to the .03% of the 
Chinese population that listen to the broadcasts, another approach may be necessary to 
reach younger generations as they increasingly look online for credible news. Chinese 
youth rate social media as the most credible media source [124]. This may indicate a need 
to focus efforts to engage objective news with Chinese citizens using micro-blogging, 
Weibo “tweets”, or other methods that are more prevalent.  
Currently one option to circumvent the Great Firewall consists of going around it 
using a Virtual Private Network (VPN). While this allows users access to censored 
information, it is typically not worth the time and effort. A majority of users use China’s 
provided government influenced alternatives for blocked websites [125]. A survey 
conducted by Global Web Index cited the percentage of Chinese citizen respondents 
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using VPN at 32% [126]. The percentage of those who utilize VPN to access restricted 
news is estimated at 12% of the 32% [126].  
In November of 2016, the Great Firewall of China received an upgrade blocking 
all encrypted connections. Furthermore all non-Chinese VPN services were removed 
[127]. This blocked opportunities of citizens to browse nets unidentified using VPN. In a 
further attempt to limit access to information outside of Chinese censorship control, 
China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology revitalized a crackdown on 
VPN services at the start of 2017 [128]. All VPN access must be approved prior to use 
which severely limits access to information outside of the CCP control. Although this has 
been a rule already in place, it is unsure how this new crackdown on VPN usage will 
effect information access in the future in China [129].  
5.5.2 Measure of Component D Variables 
Percent of Government/Non-Government Distributed Information 
These stock variables represent a change in the objective information with which 
Chinese citizens interact. The significant inputs for determining their values are 
based on a combination of the government enforced control, the estimated media 
medium interaction of citizens, and the estimated percentage of circumvention 
that is available or engaged in for each media medium.  
Global Awareness 
Global awareness is a hypothesized soft variable with a value between 0 and 1. 
The greater the objective information that citizens access, the greater their global 
awareness which directly influences their perception of their relative condition in 
component E. 
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Ability to Express Opinions/ Ability to Organize Collectively 
Ability to express opinions and ability to organize collectively are both modeled 
as soft variables believed to be inherent to a social movement’s success. The input 
for these values are based on the condition of political rights and social freedoms. 
Additionally the government enforced percent of information control influences 
their values.  
Political rights and social freedoms have different effects on the freedom of 
expression and freedom to organize. The effect of the conditions are hypothesized 
to result in a steady decrease where a higher value of condition results in a lower 
ability to express opinions or organize collectively. Political rights condition are 
estimated to have a higher impact on the ability to organize collectively and social 
freedoms are estimated to have a higher impact on the ability to express opinions 
based on Freedom House methodology. These are then normalized to a 0 to 1 
scale and weighted at 0.7 for the human rights condition predicted to have the 
greater impact and 0.3 for the other. These are then multiplied by the complement 
of the government percentage of enforced control. This represent a strict construct 
for the combination of hypothesized soft variable effects. 
5.6 Model Component E: Chinese Citizen Perception 
This portion of the model represents the emergence stage of the four stages of a 
social movement previously depicted in Figure 1. The main elements are depicted in 
Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 Component E 
5.6.1 Background for Component E 
Emergence of a movement for change arises when a general and mutual feeling of 
unrest about an issue exists within the community. This is consistent across the spectrums 
of historical civil movement and revolution analysis. Braha suggests that most often 
revolutions occur because of a gap in expectation socially, economically, and politically 
[104]. A mixed approach culminating in the emergence of a social movement is applied 
in the context of this model. China’s source of legitimacy has been linked to its 
economy’s performance [130], therefore economic performance as well as human rights 
are modeled. Relative deprivation theory posits that discontent arises as awareness of 
relative condition are made clear. The driving input in citizen expectation is based on 
global awareness (a stock variable from component D). The hypothesized relationship is 
a steady decline: an increase in global awareness is linked to a lower value on the 
Freedom house scale level of expectation. The gap between the reference conditions and 
citizen expectations are identified in portion E2 of the model. The potential building of 
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civil unrest depending on these three gaps is represented in portion E3 of the model. 
These accumulating factors are portrayed in Figure 23.  
Widespread discontent arises from a discrepancy in expectation according to relative 
deprivation theory. Economics is important to maintaining legitimacy within China [68]. 
Additionally as social deprivation theory asserts, a gap in expectation causes unrest. 
However, perhaps counterintuitively, it is hypothesized that increased social unrest 
occurs after prolonged improvements in economic development. This is known as the J-
curve theory as presented by Davies [131]. This hypothesis emphasizes that the relative 
deprivation is of greater importance than the actual condition.  
This model hypothesizes that there exists a Chinese citizen expectation for their level 
of human rights which is presented in the model as citizen expectation of political rights 
and citizen expectation of social freedom. This expectation is presented as resulting from 
their awareness relative to the globe based on the variable from component D estimating 
the percent of media consumed that is non-government messaged information.  
5.6.2 Measure of Component E Variables 
Citizen Expectation Social Freedoms / Political Rights 
Citizen expectations are a function of the competing goals of the status quo and 
relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is based solely on global awareness and 
understanding where the highest value of global awareness (1) corresponds to the 
lowest value of human rights (1). The status quo goal is based on the previous 
year’s condition using a delay. Together these goals are weighted and combined 
to form the citizen expectations for social freedoms and political rights 
respectively. 
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Citizen Expectation Economic Growth Rate 
The expectation of Chinese citizens with respect to economic growth is dependent 
solely on the values of years prior in the model. Citizens are modeled to expect at 
least the level of condition that has existed the previous year. To initialize this 
variable, GDP growth rates from the year prior to the simulation start is used. 
Oily Rag Factor 
The literature review evidences that some social movements occur because of a 
spark or trigger. This has been referred to as an oily rag effect which has the 
power to rapidly increase the momentum of a movement based on an incident. 
The input to this factor is the percent of supporters for the movement. The higher 
the percent of supporters, the more likely that an incident will spark due to 
discontent representing a growth behavior relationship. 
Social Unrest 
Social unrest represents a soft variable capturing the accumulation of key 
stressors leading to the emergence of a social movement. Social unrest is 
measured on a 0 to 1 scale where 0 represents no discontent or gap in expectation 
and 1 represents a high level of discontent. The gaps between expectation and 
condition are calculated and used as an input into social unrest. It is hypothesized 
that an increase in gaps results in an increase in civil discontent thereby 
representing a growth behavior. 
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5.7 Model Component F: Chinese Citizen Actions 
In order for a social movement to succeed, communication must lead to 
organization which leads to action [63]. This portion of the model represents the 
coalescence and bureaucratization stages of the four stages of a movement depicted in 
Figure 1. Coalescence occurs when transparency exists and communication begins to 
associate a source of discontent which may lead to mass demonstrations. If civil unrest is 
high, the coalescence represents a movement becoming collective. Such efforts in this 
stage are severely hindered by lack of transparency and communication between citizens. 
Coalescence and bureaucratization stages differ in that bureaucratization represents 
formalized organization to a strategy based effort. For example, in these circumstances an 
organization that campaigns for human rights within China represents bureaucratization. 
The summary of hypothesized variables and overarching component interactions 
regarding these stages of social movements is exhibited in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24 Component F 
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5.7.1 Background for Component F  
This portion represents the second and third stages of a social movement. This 
formalization is initialized by the desire to spread a coherent message. In this case that 
message is for more rights, both political and social for Chinese citizens. A successful 
movement requires more than a temporary change in policy or response to an incident – 
true effect results from changing minds. This is done by attacking perceptions as seen in 
cases such as the Civil Rights movement in the 1960’s [132]. Greg Satell asserts that for 
a movement to succeed it must also build connections, or a base of support as well as 
connect with the mainstream [132]. This is done over a period of time and is not an 
instant process.  
A study conducted by a Taiwanese University [133] surveyed democratic beliefs 
of Chinese students who were studying abroad. This study showed that democratic belief 
decreased for 34% of students and increased for 22% of the students [133]. The 
conclusion suggested that the reason for a lack of impact on the change in democratic 
beliefs or even the slightly negative impact, was due to a lack of engagement in 
discussion about relevant topics. A simple access to information given previously 
conditioned views of democracy resulted in little to negative net effects in support of 
democratic ideals.  
Public mobilization is likely to snowball once it reaches a sufficient tipping point 
which indicates that their growth is not necessarily linear [109]. Additionally, collective 
action in China tends to be more effective when it draws more participants, acts more 
forcefully, has an effective frame (issue linkage), or is led by those who are better 
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networked [134]. These assertions lead to a hypothesized non-linear effect of each stock 
variable found within component F.  
The threat of citizen collective action prompts a swift response from the Chinese 
Government [111]. Citizen engagement is deemed crucial in causing a response from the 
government. Although not considered, the threat of collective action such as protests or 
the threat of accountability in reporting to higher officials result in government 
responsiveness [111]. This results in the hypothesis that all citizen activities to include 
spreading pro-democratic messages, organizing, and protests all contribute to increasing 
internal pressure.  
Literature indicates that the number of protests is estimated anywhere between 
80,000 to over 100,000 each year [135]. A substantial amount of data on protests in 
China is available and future research should incorporate this as a quantifiable metric 
measuring civil action. The most common protest type appears to relate to labor and work 
[53]. The number of protests, although believed to be relatively under reported given the 
governments censorship in the media, has increased over the years [135]. Though 
anecdotal or based on proxy measures, there appears to be evidence of growing social 
unrest despite the government’s best efforts to censor its people. Given the limited extent 
of political freedoms, the people within China often have very few avenues to openly 
voice concerns to the government and therefore this may be reflected in the number of 
protests.  
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5.7.2 Measure of Component F Variables 
Citizen Spreading Movement Messages 
This represents the initiation of coalescence within a movement as citizens spread 
the message of the movement [62], [109], [132]. This is soft variable with values 
between 0 and 1, encapsulating ability of citizens to communicate social 
movement message based on transparency inherent in communication channels. It 
is hypothesized that as citizens spread democratic ideals’ messages, internal 
pressure rises as does the efforts of citizens toward civil action [60]. Additionally 
the message efforts within this variable are linked to the message efforts of the 
social movement within component G. 
Citizens Organizing Collectively 
This represents the bureaucratization phase of a social movement as groups begin 
to organize to voice support for a common cause [63]. It is hypothesized that 
increased organization within a movement leads to an increase of internal 
pressure as well as an increase in civil actions [62], [109], [132]. 
Citizen Civil Actions 
Civil actions is measured on a scale of 0 to 1 utilizing soft variable methodology. 
It represents the physical actions taken by citizens voicing their discontent in 
support of a human rights social movement. An example would be the number of 
mass incidents or protests that occur. It is hypothesized that pro democratic civil 
actions leads to higher level of internal pressure and is nonlinear in formulation 
[62], [109], [132].  
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5.8 Model Component G: Chinese Citizen Sentiment 
This section of the model aims to depict the sentiment of Chinese citizens towards 
democratic ideals of the citizens.  
 
Figure 25 Component G 
5.8.1 Background for Component G 
The frame used for the spread of the idea of democracy in this context is based 
on the Bass diffusion model. In this case it is assumed that the entire population has an 
opinion on human rights: they either oppose or support human rights (although additional 
views exist in reality). Furthermore, it is likely that age may play a factor in the potential 
support or opposition of the movement as young children and elderly are likely to be 
unable to participate as a whole. Those who do not support a movement are grouped into 
the “oppose human rights movement” category. Those who do not oppose a movement 
are grouped into the “support human rights” category. The supporters are represented by 
active supporters and sympathizers to represent those who may internally agree with pro-
democratic ideals although they are unlikely to act upon their beliefs. This distinction is 
important in that those who support a social movement actively or passively have 
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different impacts on the spread of the movement. This effect is unidentified 
authoritatively within the literature and is excluded from effects within the base model, 
although the structure to capture these two sub groups of supporters exists. The adapted 
Bass model is represented by a duplication of the original rate. The supporters of a 
movement form the “potential adopters” for the movement opposition and vice versa. 
This creates a circular rate between the two stock variables resulting in a feedback loop 
of competing rates of flow.  
5.8.2 Measure of Component G Variables 
Oppose Human Rights Movement 
This is measured by people within the population who oppose a human rights 
movement. This is primed at 80% of the initial population and through word of 
mouth and government messaging efforts, supporters of the human rights 
movement are swayed to join the opposition. 
Support Human Rights Movement 
This variable is measured in units of people and is set at an initial value of 20% of 
the initial population. The messaging efforts combined with the word of mouth 
efforts increase the flow from those who oppose the movement to become those 
who support it. 
The rates governing the flow between support and opposition of democratic ideals 
are based on the basic Bass diffusion model assertions. The total population of those who 
support democratic ideals is unknown and a sensitivity analysis is analyzed and presented 
in Chapter 6. A conservative range for this proportion is between 0 and .5 due to the 
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assumption that any greater proportion would likely be evidenced by a social movement 
in existence already.  
The traditional innovators of a product are represented as those who become 
adopters strictly from messaging of the product and not by contact with those who have 
already become adopters. In the context of these beliefs it may be represented as those 
who are swayed to either support or oppose democratic beliefs upon any reasoning other 
than persuasion from a personal contact. Additional parameters for the relationships are 
estimated in Table 10. These capture hypothesized interactions. 
Table 10 Bass Diffusion Model Adaptation Parameters 
 
Total population is an additional consideration as the population is estimated to 
grow each year. The initial population value is an input based on World Bank 2010 data 
and set at 1.338 billion people [136]. The total population found within each stock level 
grows proportionally according to China’s estimated population growth rate of .45% 
[136]. Each stock variable within this component is measured as a percentage of the 
overall population within China. 
Parameter Hypothesized Values 
Support Message Effectiveness 1 
Support Message Efforts function (Policy 2 and Citizen messaging) 
Support Contact Rate function (Percent Objective Information Accessed ) 
Support Probability 0.015 
Oppose Message Effectiveness 1 
Oppose Message Efforts function (Government human rights actions) 
Oppose Contact Rate function (Government % Enforced Information Control) 
Oppose Probability 0.015 
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5.9 Summary 
Chapter 5 provided a discussion of the construction of the underlying components 
used in creating a pilot model to better understand the spread of human rights in China. 
The reader is reminded that each of these components interact with each other as depicted 
in Figure 16. In addition more detailed representation are offered in Appendix D. Without 
a template for a model, a wide array of research covering the expansive amount of theory 
related to this topic was explored and key components indicated by the literature were 
selected for model interactions. These concepts were then used to create an initial system 
structure of interactions that matched intuition and experts insights and opinions. 
Components were modeled based on simplified relationships derived from hypotheses 
formulated in the literature. Data and proxy-measures were then added where applicable 
and possible within the scope of the research. Discussed throughout the justification of 
each component, assumptions and limitations are addressed, highlighting the initial 
efforts taken to create a structured system with which to gain understanding. The absence 
of proxy-measure data for all variables is the next step to creating a higher fidelity model 
that will prove of greater use to policy efforts. Of course, such measures have been 
referred to as the “Holy Grail” of information operations modeling. This initial model 
creates a structure with which to understand generalities of the system however further 
analysis is required to provide detailed policy decisions. Insight gained from the model 
and different sensitivity analysis conducted on key input variables is discussed in Chapter 
6. 
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VI Vetting and Results 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of steps taken with regard to validation of the 
model. There are two general critiques in assessing this model which fall under 
verification and validation.  
6.2 Introduction 
Figure 26, provided by Mitre [137], represents a useful timeline regarding system 
dynamics. Verification considers whether the system is built as described, and validation 
concerns itself with whether the system answers the desired question.  
 
Figure 26 Verification and Validation [137] 
This pilot model attempts to characterize a system in a novel way and the model provides 
a frame of understanding to approach policy strategies. This process requires an extensive 
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effort in the definition of concepts. Further assessments in this iterative process have led 
to model adjustments that improve the nature of the model and its usefulness. Therefore, 
the validation for this pilot model primarily falls in defining the system in order to 
capture the desired information. This system definition is accomplished in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, with the description of model construction which characterizes the system 
based on the reality described by the literature and discussion with a limited number of 
subject matter experts. As the iterative process continues and new concepts are 
incorporated and others refined, adjustments to the assumptions or characterizations 
presented by this initial model may be improved. Additional validation occurs on the 
latter end of the verification and validation process and is discussed in Section 6.3 in the 
context of evaluating system dynamics validation techniques with regards to the model as 
a whole.  
6.3 Validation 
6.3.1 Soft Variables  
For each variable, a source for the reasoning of its existence is provided. 
Additionally, an example of the application of the qualitative variable standards that were 
applied utilize the scale discussed in Chapter 3, Table 4. The following questions, 
adapted from the work of Hayward et al. [92], were considered for each soft variable. 
 Scale: Does the soft variable have a minimum or maximum value? 
 Units: Are there any suggested units of measure for the soft variable? 
 Nature:Is the soft variable a stock, converter, or flow? 
 Inputs: What outside elements have an effect on the soft variable? 
 Outputs: What outside elements does the soft variable affect? 
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The following discussion provides an example of the logic that was applied 
throughout model construction to utilize these soft variable definition questions. The 
following example demonstrates how such reasoning was applied to the soft variable of 
social unrest. This variable represents a real-world phenomenon recognized as a key 
factor within social movements. 
 Scale: Does the soft variable have a minimum or maximum value? 
The minimum value of social unrest occurs when all citizens have no discontent 
as expressed by no action culminating in coalescence or bureaucratization of a 
social movement. A maximum value follows from the limited capacity of an 
overwhelming societal feeling of discontent. If the nation reaches that capacity, 
then there would be no reason to envisage more social unrest as that extra unrest 
would have no effect on any dynamical element.  
 Units: Are there any suggested units of measure for the soft variable? 
Once a maximum has been set, then a percentage of the maximum might be a 
natural unit. However, other units could be constructed such as results from 
surveys questioning the satisfaction with pertinent conditions or other similar 
material.  
 Nature: Is the soft variable a stock, converter, or flow? 
Social unrest is a culminating result of discontent based upon gaps in expectation 
and circumstance in addition to the oily rag effect of culminating factors resulting 
in a higher likelihood to “spark” a movement. It is most naturally a stock 
representing the culminating level of factors. It should be noted that the 
differential calculus and underpinning of system dynamics makes a discontinuity 
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(such as a spark that lights a fire) more difficult to model. It can be represented by 
a calculation of the rate of discontent. As the expectation gap decreases the social 
unrest level decreases as well, thus a natural flow in and out both exist in the 
variable. 
 Inputs: What outside elements have an effect on the soft variable? 
According to social deprivation theory, social unrest arises from a gap in 
expectation. The inputs to this system are the gaps in expectation believed to 
effect a social movement in China: economic growth, social freedoms, and 
political rights. These gaps each have a positive effect on the system in that as the 
gaps increase, the level of social unrest increases and vice versa. 
 Outputs: What outside elements does the soft variable affect? 
The output is related to the second two stages of a social movement: coalesce and 
bureaucratize. The higher the level of social unrest, the more likely that the social 
movement will see actions in both stages.  
Soft variables utilized in this model are identified in Table 11. 
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Table 11 Soft Variables Construction 
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6.3.2 Model Validation 
Utilizing validation tests presented in Figure 15, a minimum of one validation 
source was chosen. 
Systems Mapping  
 Face validity:  
This test, founded upon Sterman’s structure assessment considerations [11], asks 
whether the model structure is consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of the 
system. The structure presented within this model, as well as all factor variables are 
founded within the literature review and discussion with experts. The structure presented 
represents what is believed to be pertinent. However, as further reviewing and 
consideration by a wider audience is applied, adjustments may be required in order to 
represent the system modeled to a higher degree of accuracy. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
highlight the support behind each structure and its general interactions that create the 
rules governing the system. 
 Validity of decision rules: 
Rooted in a more advanced consideration of validation, this test questions whether 
the decision rules capture the behavior of the actors in the system. The system, as 
understood based upon literature, is represented to incorporate pertinent decisions and 
relationships included within the system. The competing goals inherent in the nature of 
the social condition within China are represented throughout the process. Among the 
three actors combined with the interaction of the goals, influences are realized within the 
system effecting the human rights condition. An example of capturing actor behavior is 
the government’s decision to repress or respond to the internal and external pressures 
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based on their perceived control depicted in Figure 27 Example of Validity of Decision 
Rule. 
 
Figure 27 Example of Validity of Decision Rule 
Quantitative Modeling 
 Dimensional consistency  
This test focuses on the consistency within the model. Each variable utilized 
within the model either translates to a direct representation of quantified data or 
qualitative understanding which is incorporated as a soft variable. These soft variable 
parameters were summarized in Table 11 and are shown to have real world meaning 
based upon the literature. Within the interactions, soft variable relationships and effects 
are dimensionless. Additional variables in the model remain consistent with their 
respective units: people, percent of media medium consumed, and percent GDP growth. 
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Therefore, the consistency within the model meets the requirement of dimensionality 
within parameters without having to introduce parameters that have no real world 
meaning. 
 Parameter assessment  
This test considers whether all parameters have real world counterparts in 
addition to evaluating their consistency to relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge 
of the system. Three quantifiable variables are considered for the numerical knowledge of 
the system. The data used to represent GDP growth, population, population growth, and 
media consumption of Chinese citizens are all based on data and extrapolated dynamic 
relationships with time. From 2010-2016, years that are simulated in the model, 
numerical evaluations conducted show that the population, media consumption habits, 
and GDP growth all align with historical data. For soft variables, descriptive knowledge 
was applied as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Qualitative problem-behavior test  
Qualitative behavior testing concerns itself with the ability to reproduce behaviors 
of interest within the system. Endogenously, the systems of difficulty motivating the 
study are generated as seen in Section 6.3. The tendency for the system to bias towards a 
lack of-human rights is evidenced in that without exogenous variables of policy strategy 
impact, it remains at a relatively consistent state of “not-free” oscillating only slightly 
over the 30 year period between values of 6 and 7 on the Freedom House scale. 
Additional measures computing the correlation between model and data as well as 
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autocorrelation functions were not applied in validation testing due to the current lack of 
measurable data that is incorporated within the key components of the system. 
 Boundary adequacy test (problem endogeneity)  
This test considers the structure of the system and asks whether endogenous 
variables were utilized to address the key concepts in the system. The key concepts of 
goals, and their effects influencing the system over time, are all endogenous to the model. 
The exogenous variables of policy efforts and their interactions are inherent to 
assessment for potential impact and are not considered in problem endogeneity due to the 
nature of postulating a change to the system. All key components used for creating the 
baseline system are endogenous. Additional exogenous variables of influence were 
assessed; no single factor appears to have great impact on the system output of interest: 
condition of human rights within China.  
Message effectiveness, a variable found in component G of the system, is an 
assumed value due to the lack of literature found supporting a clear relationship that can 
be applied within the system. For this reason, sensitivity analysis was conducted using 
the range of its values and the results are shown in the following figures. 
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Figure 28 Message Effectiveness Sensitivity to Percent of Support 
Figure 28 indicates that the message effectiveness has a clear impact on the system.  
 
Figure 29 Message Effectiveness Sensitivity 
Figure 29 illustrates the sensitivity of message effectiveness in altering a component of 
the desired output, condition of social freedom. The full range of message effectiveness 
value appears to impact the overall efforts within the system to a limited degree. 
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Another variable exogenous to the system is the applied initial proportion of population 
who support a democratic movement. This value, as a percentage of total population, 
ranges between 0 and 1. It is clear from the literature and evidenced by current events 
within China that the value does not lie at either extreme. A sensitivity analysis on the 
proportion of those opposing democratic ideals within China was applied and is shown in 
Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30 Proportion of Opposition Political Rights Sensitivity Analysis [0,1] 
From these results, it is clear that the model is very sensitive to this input. This is 
evidenced by the wide variation in the results of the model incorporating the full 
spectrum of the output of interest. This pattern is similar to the output of social freedoms 
over time within the system. Literature, however, provides a means to better estimate the 
range of this value. It is postulated that a movement needs substantial support in order to 
succeed which, as of yet, has not occurred within China. If a majority of citizens believe 
in a social movement, indicators that are not currently present within China would exist. 
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This leads to a better estimate of possible values to fall within .5 and 1. An additional 
sensitivity analysis using the revised range is shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31 Proportion of Opposition Political Rights Sensitivity Analysis [.5,1] 
The output falls further within the expected range of the condition. Figure 31 still 
indicates that the model is sensitive to the initial value of those opposing the movement; 
however, the range is improved.  
These sensitivity tests were conducted using simulations utilizing a Latin hypercube 
design within Vensim. A uniform distribution was applied using the range of possible 
values of exogenous variables. The lack of variation within the model results in 
consistent outcome regardless of the number of simulations is increased. Analysis 
indicates that no single exogenous factor within the range of uncertainty based on 
literature appears to affect the outcome to a substantial effect based on face validity. 
Additional testing evaluating boundary adequacy are required for the validation of this 
model and results require a higher level of interaction testing in addition to examining 
single factors.  
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 Validity of decision rules  
This test concerns itself with whether the decision rules within the system capture 
the behaviors of the actors in the system. Mental models of interactions governing the 
constructed system are derived from analysis of available literature. The actions and 
interactions developed, discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, are areas for further 
investigation and discussion as to whether they accurately represent reality as follow on 
effects develop this model.  
Uncertainty Analysis 
 Policy sensitivity analysis  
Policy sensitivity analysis is addressed in Section 5.4. This considers the uncertainty 
of the efforts extended, as well as their impact to the overall system. Sensitivity analysis 
of these two factors is used in overall estimation of the policy. Future policy analysis 
should be conducted on optimization between all policy parameter combinations. 
Additionally, optimization methods to find best combinations and to generate implausible 
results or reverse policy outcomes may provide additional insights for recommendations. 
The addition of further data incorporated in the model is suggested as a step prior to such 
tests. 
Forecasting and Optimization 
 Behavior correspondence  
This question concerns itself with whether the model quantitatively is able to 
reproduce the behavior of interest in the system. The base model represented achieves 
this result. This was further discussed previously within this section, Section 6.3.   
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6.4 Results 
The base model produces results that appear consistent with past model behavior. 
Figure 32 and Figure 33 present the historical condition of human rights and the system 
generated condition of human rights respectively. The timeline for historical data is from 
1960-present and the generated data spans the years 2010 to 2040. This data supports a 
key assumption of the model in that China will remain “not free” unless additional efforts 
assisting reformation to a more democratic nation are pursued. This assumption is based 
on the evidenced lack of change of democracy status since the beginning of the current 
structure of government in place. Additionally, the previously held view that China may 
become more democratic as it embraces capitalist economic values is shown at best to be 
very low or at worst false based on historical evidence. This foundational assumption 
leads to characterizing a system that biases towards a “not-free” state on the Freedom 
House scale. It appears that “freedoms” remain a “hard sell” in the current structure of 
China; however, this does not preclude continuing to try.  With the confines of this initial 
experiment, the model appears to be valid and promising. 
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Figure 32 Historical Human Rights Performance 
 
Figure 33 Base Model Human Rights Condition 
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6.5 Policy Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 4, policy strategy facilitation does not directly represent 
real world values of dollars spent. Rather three strategies were identified by grouping 
current efforts: 
 Policy 1 – Top-down Efforts 
 Policy 2 – Bottom-up Efforts 
 Policy 3 – Grassroots Efforts 
United States engages in efforts to promote human rights and democracy in China. 
Additional and more detailed analysis to determine which programs translate to each 
constructed strategy, is suggested prior to effecting policy actions. The resulting 
recommendations suggest future policy analysis initiatives to be identified for their 
ability to achieve goals within the three strategies presented. For example: a grassroots 
effort represents facilitating VPN which allows citizens to circumvent the Great Firewall 
of China. A top-down effort could be threatening or employing sanctions against China 
unless certain standards of human rights are met. A bottom-up effort could represent 
radio broadcasting pro-democratic messages, communicating via web based medium, or 
distributing leaflets within China. These representations are based on the interaction of 
the efforts within the model. The location of influence lends itself to measures aligning 
with each strategy policy to real-world representations as just discussed. This is shown in 
the visual map of the model in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34 Policy Efforts Strategy Impact Visual 
 Testing conducted applied all efforts of policy strategy settings over a period of 
simulations utilizing a uniform distribution for parameter inputs and a Latin hypercube 
design space. The combinations of testing individual strategy values, individual strategy 
factors, and a combination of both individual strategy values combined with individual 
strategy factors were considered. Additionally, testing including each policy combination 
with respect to their values was considered. The resulting averages for each test are 
shown in  
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Table 12.  
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Table 12 Average Value System Condition (Scale of 1 to 7) 
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
1 Efforts 5.78 6.16 5.62 
2 Efforts 5.79 5.81 5.77 
3 Efforts 6.00 6.10 5.91 
     
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
1 Both 5.35 5.67 5.03 
2 Both 5.82 5.77 5.88 
3 Both 4.93 5.23 4.63 
     
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
1 Factor 5.24 5.57 4.92 
2 Factor 6.13 5.77 5.86 
3 Factor 4.86 5.17 4.54 
     
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
12 Combine 5.57 5.61 5.53 
13 Combine 5.70 5.73 5.67 
23 Combine 5.86 5.93 5.78 
123 Combine 5.48 5.54 5.42 
 
“Efforts” refer to varying the policy on its value between 0 and 1. “Factor” refers to 
varying the policy effect on the system which is dependent on the policy. “Both” refers to 
varying both the factor value and its effect on the system. Finally, “Combine” represents 
the efforts of policies varied for multiple policies. These values represent the average 
condition for the entire simulation spanning the thirty year horizon.  
 For a decision maker, it is important to understand which human rights are 
weighted or prioritized because political rights and social freedoms are not consistently 
dominant within any single policy (under efforts sensitivity refer to Policy 1 and Policy 2 
results, for political rights and social freedoms). A second note of these results is that 
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combining all policies results in the best outcome for the average value of the human 
rights conditions when not accounting for factor sensitivities.  
Additionally, when comparing the factor sensitivity to the effort sensitivity, it 
appears that the factor has a greater impact indicating that pursuing options to further 
narrow policy effect ranges would be beneficial. When factor effects are considered, the 
recommended policy is dominantly Policy 3, grassroots efforts. The potential of this 
policy alone provides better results than the combination of all policy efforts. Limiting 
the range of factor effect on the system would assist in providing a consistent 
recommendation regardless if effort or factor are varied. 
The average value of the condition is not the only consideration. It is also 
suggested that the speed at which the condition reforms should be considered. This may 
be an important factor considering that the assumptions this model is based on are 
centered on a “not free” condition of China. It may be easier to achieve an improved 
condition from 4 to 1 as opposed to 7 to 4. A time weighted value of the policies was 
applied and results are shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13 Average Time Scaled Influence (Scale 0 to 1) 
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
1 Efforts 0.65 0.68 0.61 
2 Efforts 0.62 0.58 0.66 
3 Efforts 0.67 0.66 0.67 
     
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
1 Both 0.57 0.59 0.54 
2 Both 0.64 0.59 0.69 
3 Both 0.46 0.49 0.43 
     
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
1 Factor 0.55 0.57 0.52 
2 Factor 0.62 0.58 0.66 
3 Factor 0.45 0.48 0.42 
     
Policy Sensitivity Human Rights Political Rights Social Freedoms 
12 Combine 0.66 0.64 0.68 
13 Combine 0.71 0.70 0.72 
23 Combine 0.69 0.66 0.71 
123 Combine 0.65 0.64 0.67 
 
This is achieved by weighting the condition values by the time it takes to achieve that 
level of condition and then normalizing the value to a 0 to 1 scale. In this measure, a 
value of 0 represents a system with a freedom scale value of 1 for the entirety of the 
simulation. A value of 1 represents a system that remains at a value of 7 for the entirety 
of the simulation. This weighting rewards the speed of transition towards a value of 1. 
The recommendations are not wholly consistent across policies (refer to Policy 1 and 
Policy 2 effort sensitivity results for human rights in each table). 
 The next step for a decision maker is to prioritize the importance of results: the 
value versus the time as well as the specific human rights. Depending on the values of 
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importance placed on these measures, different Policies may become the focus of future 
research. An example of this is shown in Table 14 where both the value and time are 
weighted at .5 of the resulting score  
Table 14 Combined Weighted Average of Time and Value 
Policy Sensitivity 
Human 
Rights 
Political 
Rights 
Social 
Freedoms 
1 Efforts 0.67 0.71 0.64 
2 Efforts 0.65 0.63 0.67 
3 Efforts 0.69 0.69 0.69 
     
Policy Sensitivity 
Human 
Rights 
Political 
Rights 
Social 
Freedoms 
1 Both 0.59 0.63 0.56 
2 Both 0.66 0.63 0.69 
3 Both 0.51 0.55 0.48 
     
Policy Sensitivity 
Human 
Rights 
Political 
Rights 
Social 
Freedoms 
1 Factor 0.58 0.61 0.54 
2 Factor 0.68 0.63 0.68 
3 Factor 0.50 0.54 0.46 
     
Policy Sensitivity 
Human 
Rights 
Political 
Rights 
Social 
Freedoms 
12 Combine 0.66 0.65 0.66 
13 Combine 0.69 0.69 0.69 
23 Combine 0.69 0.68 0.70 
123 Combine 0.65 0.64 0.65 
 
The value for the condition was first normalized to a 0 to 1 range prior to weighting with 
a value of .5. It appears that Policy 2 has a greater effect on the system than Policy 1 
(refer to effort sensitivity of Policy 1 and Policy 2 in political rights and social freedoms 
as well as the combined Policy 1 and 2 results in these respective areas). Visual 
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representations of each value are presented in Appendix E. An example of these outputs 
are provided in Figure 35 and Figure 36. 
 
Figure 35 Policy 1 "Both" Political Rights Sensitivity 
 
Figure 36 Policy 2 "Both" Political Rights Sensitivity 
This comparison shows why the weighting of average value and time are 
important. Although Policy 1, top-down efforts, has an average value that is lower for 
political rights over the simulated period, the model suggests that Policy 2, bottom-up 
efforts, is able to more quickly realize a lower (better) value. 
Overall a combined policy of using all three influences is suggested. At a cursory 
look, Policy 1 appears to have the greatest single influence on human rights, however, 
this model is characterized by a conservative estimate of effects of impact on the system. 
This is shown by the factor effect testing and in these tests Policy 3, grassroots efforts, is 
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clearly dominate in both average and time respects. This leads to the conclusion that 
Policy 3 should be further investigated in order to more fully understand the impacts 
upon the system. 
Policy influences are realized on the system and have logical response that 
represents the effects desired in reality. A transition towards more human rights is 
gradual and may not follow a strict trend line. All simulated combinations applied in 
sensitivity testing confirmed this logical trend influencing the system towards this 
gradual increase in human rights (represented by lower values on the scale of one to 
seven).  
Additionally, policy interactions do not follow necessarily intuitive results - the 
combination efforts of Policy 1, top-down efforts, and Policy 3, grassroots efforts, for 
example, illustrate an increase in the time weighted measure as opposed to single effort 
tests for each policy respectively. This may be due to the interactions attempting to 
influence the system too quickly causing further repressive action responses by the 
governments perceived control level. In reality, this may translate to any attempt to 
influence the system too quickly resulting in the Chinese government feeling threatened 
and responding opposite to the desired influence.  
6.6 Investigative Questions Answered 
Do the actions America is currently applying create lasting change? From the 
literature, it appears very difficult to force outside change and this is evidenced in the 
model as well. However, in conventional thinking, lasting change must come from within 
and the citizens themselves. An outside force or nation imposing its views upon another 
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and using messaging at a high level such as sanctions, threats, or messaging may help 
with small battles but the war will be won by the government reforming to the will of the 
people as powerfully demonstrated in recent decades in cultures as diverse as East 
German and Egypt. From this line of thinking it appears that this model is consistent with 
the popular view on this topic.  
“The best way to advance human rights in the [United States]-China relationship 
is first and foremost to recognize that the engine of human rights progress in China today 
is the Chinese citizenry itself” [138]. From this, it appears that facilitating Chinese 
citizens to act upon their own beliefs and to provide them with objective information is 
one of the most promising long term impacts the United States can have on this issue. 
Currently it appears that the United States provides minimal assistance to NGO’s acting 
in this effort or for programs such as Voice of America in China. However, with the 
digital age replacing radio broadcasts as well as other mediums, it would be useful to 
research the potential impact for a campaign in utilizing digital media. “Breeching” the 
Great Fire Wall to facilitate internet and social media messages appears to be a promising 
approach. 
The following research questions have all been addressed throughout this process: 
1. What are the key variables involved in spreading democracy in China? 
2. What are the interacting relationships between the key variables? 
3. What United States policy strategies represent the best options of 
influence? 
4. How do these strategies create influence? 
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The first two questions are defined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 discussion of the 
methodology applied in model construction. The third and fourth questions regarding 
policy analysis consideration and implementation effects have been addressed in Section 
6.5 along which includes recommendations stemming from the discussion of their results.  
6.7 Summary 
The tests presented provide a level of validation for the model. Further tests, 
while not employed for this pilot model, may be appropriate as the model is further 
developed. The system dynamics process of modeling is an iterative process and constant 
improvement can be made as additional data or information is incorporated in the model 
to provide a better simulation of reality. Despite official validation methods, the critical 
question when assessing a system dynamics model pertains to whether it is useful for the 
stated purposes.  
This model provides a visualization of a large and multifaceted concept. To 
increase precision in results, additional measures must be included; further validation 
must be conducted. For the purposes of creating a pilot model and examining generalized 
policy strategies in their influence of the diffusion of democratic ideals and reforming 
conditions in China, this model does prove useful. Therefore, at a minimum, this model is 
useful in accomplishing its purpose although additional validation would benefit the 
reality simulated by the model. This chapter summarized efforts in validation to include 
the creation of soft variables as well as traditional validation tests presented in literature. 
Additionally, sensitivity of exogenous variables within policy strategies was applied and 
results discussed. While a “soft” operations research model may not meet the engineering 
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rigor validation of a traditional model, if it aids in the assistance of addressing “wicked 
problems” without leading the analyst astray, it has met the test of being a useful model.   
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VII Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides conclusions derived from the presented research. A 
highlight of results is provided as well as a discussion of the interpretation of significance 
and recommended actions based on this research. Following is a discussion detailing 
considerations for future research. This includes suggestions for expansions and model 
revisions to meet a higher fidelity of system dynamics rigor. 
7.2 Research Outcomes 
 The spread of democracy within China is a sizeable scoped concept. This research 
addresses the issue from a system dynamics approach to investigate possible sources of 
influence available to an external actor that impact Chinese government reformation. This 
thesis presents an innovative approach to creating an initial system capturing pertinent 
elements effecting these circumstances. For this research a template was not found 
presenting the ideas of policy in regard to spreading democratic ideals within China. 
Additionally data did not line up with the desired measures within the system however 
combining analysis and insights from the literature and system dynamics principles, a 
pilot model was created. The voices and expertise provided from the literature review and 
discussions with available subject matter experts provided the basis for modeling and 
utilizing system dynamics in this research. System dynamics provides a way to visualize 
and simulate the complex interactions between multiple key variables. Rather than solely 
relying on suggestion of experts, this research attempts to take a systems view of the 
situation. Additional precision utilizing such an approach is feasible given access to data 
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that translates to reasonable measures of system elements. As an area of applied 
understanding, system dynamics takes an approach of mixing expertise (the art) with 
mathematical measurements (the science).  
At a minimum, this research has accomplished a new level of systems thinking 
approach to the problem at hand by identifying interactions and relationships 
hypothesized to be pertinent to the system. The pilot model presented is open for 
criticism of potentially incorrectly hypothesized variables and/or missing or redundant 
variables and interactions. The result of this research’s culminating efforts are a step 
towards modeling the system and concepts. Its intent is to contribute to the discussion of 
an approach at impacting the human rights condition in China as well as creating and 
validating a new approach to applying system dynamics to an ambiguous policy. At a 
maximum, this model is assumed to be generally correct in its approach and can provide 
insight into which strategy of external actors represents the greatest effect in providing 
change to the system. Presuming that it meets a sufficient level of fidelity within the 
community of policy experts – it will provide a motivation for guiding policy efforts by 
the United States by suggesting that efforts should be aimed at increasing facilitation 
tools for the modeled movement in order to have the greatest desired impact within 
China.  
This research is unique in that it attempts to define the system involving the 
spread of human rights within China. While previous research has explored components 
of civil unrest, formulating models such as factors leading to increased protests, there 
does not appear to publicly exist a model applying relevant theories in relation to a 
mathematically constructed model representing efforts and impact within China. 
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This research utilizes a system dynamics approach in balancing an emphasis on 
two key components used to represent the spread of human rights in the form of 
measured democratization in China: political rights and social freedoms. These two 
concepts were explored to identify components that are vital to effecting this system. 
These components were then explored further to hypothesize interactions based on 
literature and expertise. Each element affects other elements reinforcing or balancing. 
System dynamics is highly visual, implicit mental models are made explicit which allows 
for an expansion to share and critique with a purpose to create a system that better 
represents reality. The purpose of this system is to investigate policy strategies that will 
improve system behavior. To this end the research achieves its goal.  
 Additionally, this research provides an opportunity for critical thinking. Modeling 
decisions and application within the system dynamics realm can be criticized, but these 
do not detract from the accomplishment of this research as an exercise of pursuing a 
deeper understanding of a complex topic. A high level of mathematical rigor is often an 
ideal, however this should not prevent operations researchers from pursuing methods 
such as system dynamics which allow investigation when precise measurements are not 
available. To this end, this work suggests that system dynamics is an apt tool for policy 
analysis as well as information warfare, both of which find themselves incorporated 
within this study.  
7.3 Discussion and Recommendations for Future Research 
“All models are wrong; some models are useful” [139]. The model presented is a 
pilot investigation at visualizing and simulating effects pertinent to the modeled system. 
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The proposed initial model is undoubtedly imprecise; all models are abstractive of reality. 
Its potential usefulness, the purpose driving this research, however, is discussed 
previously within this chapter. In order to increase the validity and fidelity of the 
presented model two areas are recommended for evaluation and further consideration. 
There are encompassed in two categories: system dynamics application assessment and 
potential absent relevant topical data and information. The following sections recommend 
further considerations that were not incorporated within the scope of this project. 
Additionally, validation adhering to system dynamics standards is a continuous process 
that does not cease as improvements to model structure and behavior are realized. 
7.3.1 Model Boundaries  
 Policy Strategies 
 The strategies presented in the analysis portion of this research remains constant 
throughout the simulation. In reality, it is likely that policy adjusts over time according to 
different inputs. A dynamic presentation of policy efforts is suggested for future 
investigation. 
Measures 
The measures chosen such as Freedom House scale for democracy and soft 
variable modeling parameters can and should be reexamined to determine if additional 
and/or more appropriate measures could be applied. In the soft variable discussion, 
suggested proxy measures are identified when considered, however future discussion 
with experts and additional literature review may lead to more practical measures or 
create requirements for further intelligence.  
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Exogenous Factors 
 As modeled, the exogenous input into the system created is only considered based 
on identified grouping of United States efforts. Additional efforts exist found within 
human rights groups across the globe as well as additional nation efforts. The efforts 
modeled in the system are applicable to similar endeavors by any group; however, this 
model does not distinguish a separation of effects by other exogenous entities.  
7.3.2 Model Modifications 
Diffusion 
The Bass model was used as a basis for the spread of the movement. This relies 
on several assumptions and the adjustment to the model requires further efforts to 
validate the relationship proposed. Additionally, the proposed relationship assumes that 
citizens fall within two categories at all times, those who oppose democratic ideals and 
those who support democratic ideals. In reality, the views on this topic are surely on a 
spectrum and perhaps another method of modeling the relationship such as using an 
epidemiological diffusion model adapted to this scenario may be better suited. Additional 
models found in literature which may be pertinent to this scenario were discussed in 
section 3.4.2. 
Social Movement Theory 
This model takes assumptions based on social deprivation theory, however within 
the literature there remains an extensive amount of potential other causes for emergence 
in a social movement. Additional social movement theories can be examined changing 
the causes for unrest modeled in component E of the model. 
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Stage 4 Social Movement Scenarios 
Figure 1 identifies four stages of a social movement. The fourth stage of decline 
can be represented as repression, co-optation, success, and failure. This model accounts 
for success at reformation of the government and the impacts of repression; however, it 
does not consider failure or co-optation. This assumption is presented as the belief that a 
desire for human rights is universal and inherent within human nature to desire a level of 
rights. Thus, regardless of circumstance this desire cannot be extinguished from all 
members of a society. Although the literature indicated otherwise, freedom may well be a 
relative concept in different cultures. Expansion on the model may vary this assumption 
to include modeling the full scope of possible results on this social movement. 
7.3.3 Additional Variable and Relationship Considerations 
Repression Efforts 
The Chinese government’s repression could potentially be measured as a lagged 
variable in the estimated spending on stability maintenance. This number has gone 
unreported officially since 2013 and analyst say numbers that are reported by the CCP are 
likely to be significantly underreported [140]. Numbers since 2013 are estimated at 
approximately $126 billion and in 2014 approximately $130 billion [141]. The rise in 
2014 is estimated at 8.7 percent. This spending represents the main component measured 
in repression as it is the funding provided to maintain social internal stability.  
Impact of Social Unrest 
Within the model social unrest directly effects citizen actions which result in 
potentially impacting government perceptions and rise of supporters within the 
movement. This model presents this as a focus on political reform within the government 
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however additional possible consequences of social unrest such as economic focused may 
affect the system and are not considered in this sphere [117]. As mentioned below when 
discussing the impact of the Hong Kong Umbrella movement, a lack of greater effect 
may be linked to the lack of impact on economy, therefore a greater impact on economy 
may cause a greater effect on government reformation. 
Demographic Influences 
While the demographic response may vary on every tier in the realm of 
possibilities, the suggested potential sources for greatest differentiation in democratic 
ideal movement responses are an area for further investigation. The literature review 
suggests including the difference in geographic region (urban vs rural, coastline cities vs 
inland cities), education level, and affluence. China is vast in geographic land mass but 
the diversity between regions is not considered within this initial model. There is a 
hypothesized difference between rural and urban responses in a movement promoting 
democratic ideals due to issues that are pertinent within each respective region. 
Existing Sources of Contention 
Currently within China there exists a level of oppression for specific groups 
which may be a source for the democratic ideal movement. For example, labor disputes, 
land seizures, religious oppression (Falun Gong, Christianity, etc.), and regional 
oppression such as Tibet are all potential sources for discontent.  
China as a Nation 
This model does not incorporate additional conflicts causing social unrest within 
China such as border conflicts. Additionally, Taiwan and Hong Kong aspects are not 
incorporated in the model. Hong Kong, returned to China control under a fifty year 
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contract in 1997, is a source that would be pertinent to democratic ideal diffusion studies. 
The Umbrella movement is a social movement of democracy that occurred in 2014. 
There is speculation as to its actual effects. It appears to have had mixed effects in 
achieving its goal of political rights that initiated its emergence [138], [142]. Despite 42% 
of voters supporting political reforms prior to the initiation of the Umbrella movement, 
the reforms have not been realized as an effect of the movement at the time of this 
writing [143] 
The Hong Kong umbrella movement potentially: 
 -Politicized Citizens [144] 
 -Increased Awareness [144] 
-Failed due to lack of impact on the economy [145] 
 -Failed due to goal misinterpretation [146] 
The Hong Kong Umbrella movement may be a strong indicator of responses and 
actions expected within the whole of China. Further investigation into causes and impacts 
associated with it may provide additional insight that can be applied to adjust the 
presented model of this research. Furthermore, translating the efforts involved in 
Tiananmen Square may provide useful parameters for such a model.  
Censorship Relationships 
A study by Hobbs and Roberts has shown that as censorship increases, a larger 
portion of users attempt to access information outside of Chinese control leading to 
investments in censorship evasion technology [125].  
Online Protest Effect 
It is hypothesized that the limiting effect on expression and group organization 
cause the government to be more responsive to other methods of collective action, so 
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much so that even online protest and attention can cause effective change without the 
need for action. This is potentially supported by the potential online protest effect 
Hongjin Wu was able to achieve [147].  
Credibility of Information 
Chinese citizens perceive credibility based on information sources which may 
impact the spread of messages in support of the government or a pro-democracy 
movement. A study reported discrepancy in trust depending on the source of news: either 
official news media outlets labeled ‘Official’ or news disseminated by citizens labeled 
‘Citizens’[120]. The trust, labeled low and high as seen in  
Table 15 could be used as an assumption across media mediums.  
Table 15 Percentage of Trust in News Source 
  
News Source 
Official Citizen 
23% High Low 
20% Low High 
32% Low Low 
25% High High 
 
7.3.4 Further Data Sources 
A list of data sources which may be useful for future research in identifying 
variables and relationships pertinent to this question is presented in Table 16. For each 
source, it is recommended to first achieve an understanding of the methodology used in 
capturing the reported data presented prior to accepting the values as presented. The 
reporting agency may have a biased view that alters the values of data presented. For 
example, the credibility of National Bureau of Statistics of China economic data on China 
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is concluded as less credible than economic data on China produced by the United States 
and Europe [148]. 
Table 16 Relevant Data Sources 
Label Description Data Range URL 
GDELT 
Database monitoring world news 
media 
1979-2017 http://www.gdeltproject.org/  
World Bank 
Global development data 
including economic, social, and 
political data collected and 
presented  
Varied http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Asian Barometer 
Survey data indicating views on 
democracy and other pertinent 
topics within mainland China and 
surrounding nations in Asia 
Varied 
between 
2001-2014 
http://asianbarometer.org/ 
US Foreign AID 
Data separated into categories of 
United States aid provided to 
other nations 
Varied http://explorer.usaid.gov/ 
National Bureau 
of Statistics of 
China 
China based   http://data.stats.gov.cn/ 
 
This list is not inclusive and additional databases and information exists that may 
be pertinent to this topic which were not viewed during this research process. For 
example: 
 Yu Jianrong – Researcher promoting reform within China  
 Dui Hua Foundation – Compiles a Political Prisoner Database and Mass Incident 
Database 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the significance of the research posed in 
this thesis. The concluding action recommendation is for future United States policy to 
focus on means that facilitate the existence of a movement. This involves further 
exploration of methods that allow Chinese citizens to circumvent government censorship 
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and media propaganda in order to access objective information and communicate ideas. 
The limitations and suggestions for further model examinations, as well as suggestions 
for additional model expansions and modifications, are presented for consideration in 
detail within this chapter. While the proposed model may be considered as inadequately 
representative of the inherent complexity of the factors and relationships in the eyes of a 
China expert, it is a step that characterizes and frames many complex aspects in the 
dynamic system in a way that can provide useful insight. 
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Appendix A: Freedom House Methodology 
The following appendix is directly from Freedom House methodology [33]. 
Checklist Questions 
The bulleted subquestions are intended to provide guidance to the analysts regarding 
what issues are meant to be considered in scoring each checklist question. The analysts 
do not need to consider every subquestion during the scoring process, as the relevance of 
each varies from one place to another. 
 
Political Rights (0–40 points) 
 
A.    Electoral Process (0–12 points) 
 
1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free 
and fair elections? 
 Did established and reputable national and/or international election monitoring 
organizations judge the most recent elections for head of government to be free 
and fair? (Note: Heads of government chosen through various electoral 
frameworks, including direct elections for president, indirect elections for prime 
minister by parliament, and the electoral college system for electing presidents, 
are covered under this and the following sub-questions. In cases of indirect 
elections for the head of government, the elections for the legislature that chose 
the head of government, as well as the selection process of the head of 
government himself, should be taken into consideration.) 
 Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent 
election for head of government? 
 Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, 
transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner? 
 Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access 
throughout the campaign free of intimidation? 
 Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure? 
 Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue 
pressure or intimidation? 
 Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results 
made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing 
parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty? 
 Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to 
ensure equal representation? 
 Has a democratically elected head of government who was chosen in the most 
recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note: Although 
a peaceful, “velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly 
if it replaces a head of government who was not freely and fairly elected—the 
new leader has not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.) 
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 In cases where elections for regional, provincial, or state governors and/or other 
subnational officials differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does 
the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved 
political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights? 
 
2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair 
elections? 
 Did established and reputable domestic and/or international election monitoring 
organizations judge the most recent national legislative elections to be free and 
fair?  
 Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent 
national legislative election? 
 Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, 
transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner? 
 Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access 
throughout the campaign free of intimidation? 
 Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure? 
 Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue 
pressure or intimidation? 
 Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results 
made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing 
parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty? 
 Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to 
ensure equal representation? 
 Have the representatives of a democratically elected national legislature who were 
chosen in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent 
coup? (Note: Although a peaceful, “velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive 
outcome—particularly if it replaces a national legislature whose representatives 
were not freely and fairly elected—members of the new legislature have not been 
freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.) 
 In cases where elections for subnational councils/parliaments differ significantly 
in conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections 
reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, 
alternatively, a worsening of political rights? 
 
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair? 
 Is there a clear, detailed, and fair legislative framework for conducting elections? 
(Note: Changes to electoral laws should not be made immediately preceding an 
election if the ability of voters, candidates, or parties to fulfill their roles in the 
election is infringed.) 
 Are election commissions or other election authorities independent and free from 
government or other pressure and interference? 
 Is the composition of election commissions fair and balanced? 
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 Do election commissions or other election authorities conduct their work in an 
effective and competent manner? 
 Do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage? (Note: Suffrage can be 
suspended or withdrawn for reasons of legal incapacity, such as mental incapacity 
or conviction of a serious criminal offense.) 
 Is the drawing of election districts conducted in a fair and nonpartisan manner, as 
opposed to gerrymandering for personal or partisan advantage? 
 Has the selection of a system for choosing legislative representatives (such as 
proportional versus majoritarian) been manipulated to advance certain political 
interests or to influence the electoral results? 
 
B.    Political Pluralism and Participation (0–16 points) 
 
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and 
fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
 Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to 
be formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements, 
excessively large membership requirements, etc.? 
 Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies, 
or other peaceful activities? 
 Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or 
subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities? 
 
2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition 
to increase its support or gain power through elections? 
 Are various legal/administrative restrictions selectively applied to opposition 
parties to prevent them from increasing their support base or successfully 
competing in elections? 
 Are there legitimate opposition forces in positions of authority, such as in the 
national legislature or in subnational governments? 
 Are opposition party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, 
imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political 
activities? 
 
3.    Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other 
powerful group? 
 Do such groups offer bribes to voters and/or political figures in order to influence 
their political choices? 
 Do such groups intimidate, harass, or attack voters and/or political figures in order 
to influence their political choices? 
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 Does the military control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government 
policy and activities, including in countries that nominally are under civilian 
control? 
 Do foreign governments control or enjoy a preponderant influence over 
government policy and activities by means including the presence of foreign 
military troops, the use of significant economic threats or sanctions, etc.? 
 
4.    Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights 
and electoral opportunities? 
 Do political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific 
concern to minority groups? 
 Does the government inhibit the participation of minority groups in national or 
subnational political life through laws and/or practical obstacles? 
 Are political parties based on ethnicity, culture, or religion that espouse peaceful, 
democratic values legally permitted and de facto allowed to operate? 
 
C.    Functioning of Government (0–12 points) 
 
1.    Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative 
representatives determine the policies of the government? 
 Are the candidates who were elected freely and fairly duly installed in office? 
 Do other appointed or non–freely elected state actors interfere with or prevent 
freely elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and 
making meaningful policy decisions? 
 Do nonstate actors, including criminal gangs, the military, and foreign 
governments, interfere with or prevent elected representatives from adopting and 
implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions? 
 
2.    Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 
 Has the government implemented effective anticorruption laws or programs to 
prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflict 
of interest? 
 Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration 
requirements, or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption? 
 Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies that 
function without impediment or political pressure or influence? 
 Are allegations of corruption by government officials thoroughly investigated and 
prosecuted without prejudice, particularly against political opponents? 
 Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media? 
 Do whistleblowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy 
legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and 
corruption? 
 What was the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
score for this country? 
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3.    Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it 
operate with openness and transparency? 
 Are civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and other citizens able to 
comment on and influence pending policies or legislation? 
 Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information about 
government operations and the means to petition government agencies for it? 
 Is the budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public 
scrutiny? 
 Does the government publish detailed accounting expenditures in a timely 
fashion? 
 Does the state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of 
government contracts? 
 Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media 
scrutiny and verification? 
 
Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions:  
 
A.    For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the 
system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage 
public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler? (0–4 
points) 
 Is there a non-elected legislature that advises the monarch on policy issues? 
 Are there formal mechanisms for individuals or civic groups to speak with or 
petition the monarch? 
 Does the monarch take petitions from the public under serious consideration? 
 
B.    Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic 
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political 
balance in favor of another group? (−4 to 0 points) 
 Is the government providing economic or other incentives to certain people in 
order to change the ethnic composition of a region or regions? 
 Is the government forcibly moving people in or out of certain areas in order to 
change the ethnic composition of those regions? 
 Is the government arresting, imprisoning, or killing members of certain ethnic 
groups in order change the ethnic composition of a region or regions? 
 
Civil Liberties (0–60 points) 
 
D.    Freedom of Expression and Belief (0–16 points) 
 
1.    Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?  
(Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of 
view, the survey gives the system credit.) 
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 Are print, broadcast, and/or internet-based media directly or indirectly censored? 
 Is self-censorship among journalists common, especially when reporting on 
politically sensitive issues, including corruption or the activities of senior 
officials? 
 Are libel, blasphemy, or security laws used to punish journalists who scrutinize 
government officials and policies or other powerful entities through either 
onerous fines or imprisonment? 
 Is it a crime to insult the honor and dignity of the president and/or other 
government officials? How broad is the range of such prohibitions, and how 
vigorously are they enforced? 
 If media outlets are dependent on the government for their financial survival, does 
the government withhold funding in order to propagandize, primarily provide 
official points of view, and/or limit access by opposition parties and civic critics? 
Do powerful private actors engage in similar practices? 
 Does the government attempt to influence media content and access through 
means including politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies and 
newspaper registrations, unfair control and influence over printing facilities and 
distribution networks, selective distribution of advertising, onerous registration 
requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery? 
 Are journalists threatened, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed by government 
or nongovernmental actors for their legitimate journalistic activities, and if such 
cases occur, are they investigated and prosecuted fairly and expeditiously? 
 Are works of literature, art, music, or other forms of cultural expression censored 
or banned for political purposes? 
 
2.    Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and 
express themselves in public and private? 
 Are registration requirements employed to impede the free functioning of 
religious institutions? 
 Are members of religious groups, including minority faiths and movements, 
harassed, fined, arrested, or beaten by the authorities for engaging in their 
religious practices? 
 Are religious practice and expression impeded by violence or harassment from 
nonstate actors? 
 Does the government appoint or otherwise influence the appointment of religious 
leaders? 
 Does the government control the production and distribution of religious books 
and other materials and the content of sermons? 
 Is the construction of religious buildings banned or restricted? 
 Does the government place undue restrictions on religious education? Does the 
government require religious education? 
 Are individuals free to eschew religious beliefs and practices in general? 
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3.    Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive 
political indoctrination? 
 Are teachers and professors free to pursue academic activities of a political and 
quasi-political nature without fear of physical violence or intimidation by state or 
nonstate actors? 
 Does the government pressure, strongly influence, or control the content of school 
curriculums for political purposes? 
 Are student associations that address issues of a political nature allowed to 
function freely? 
 Does the government, including through school administration or other officials, 
pressure students and/or teachers to support certain political figures or agendas, 
including pressuring them to attend political rallies or vote for certain candidates? 
Conversely, does the government, including through school administration or 
other officials, discourage or forbid students and/or teachers from supporting 
certain candidates and parties? 
 
4.    Is there open and free private discussion? 
 Are people able to engage in private discussions, particularly of a political nature 
(in places including restaurants, public transportation, and their homes) without 
fear of harassment or detention by the authorities or powerful nonstate actors? 
 Do users of personal online communications—including private e-mail, text 
messages, or personal blogs with a limited following—face legal penalties, 
harassment, or violence from the government or powerful nonstate actors in 
retaliation for critical remarks? 
 Does the government employ people or groups to engage in public surveillance 
and to report alleged antigovernment conversations to the authorities? 
 
E.    Associational and Organizational Rights (0–12 points) 
 
1.    Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
 Are peaceful protests, particularly those of a political nature, banned or severely 
restricted? 
 Are the legal requirements to obtain permission to hold peaceful demonstrations 
particularly cumbersome and time consuming? 
 Are participants of peaceful demonstrations intimidated, arrested, or assaulted? 
 Are peaceful protestors detained by police in order to prevent them from engaging 
in such actions? 
 
2.    Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations?  (Note: This includes civic 
organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.) 
 Are registration and other legal requirements for nongovernmental organizations 
particularly onerous and intended to prevent them from functioning freely? 
 Are laws related to the financing of nongovernmental organizations unduly 
complicated and cumbersome? 
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 Are donors and funders of nongovernmental organizations free of government 
pressure? 
 Are members of nongovernmental organizations intimidated, arrested, 
imprisoned, or assaulted because of their work? 
 
3.    Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is 
there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private 
organizations? 
 Are trade unions allowed to be established and to operate free from government 
interference? 
 Are workers pressured by the government or employers to join or not to join 
certain trade unions, and do they face harassment, violence, or dismissal from 
their jobs if they do? 
 Are workers permitted to engage in strikes, and do members of unions face 
reprisals for engaging in peaceful strikes? (Note: This question may not apply to 
workers in essential government services or public safety jobs.) 
 Are unions able to bargain collectively with employers and able to negotiate 
collective bargaining agreements that are honored in practice? 
 For states with very small populations or primarily agriculturally-based 
economies that do not necessarily support the formation of trade unions, does the 
government allow for the establishment of peasant organizations or their 
equivalents? Is there legislation expressively forbidding the formation of trade 
unions? 
 Are professional organizations, including business associations, allowed to 
operate freely and without government interference? 
 
F.    Rule of Law (0–16 points) 
 
1.    Is there an independent judiciary? 
 Is the judiciary subject to interference from the executive branch of government 
or from other political, economic, or religious influences? 
 Are judges appointed and dismissed in a fair and unbiased manner? 
 Do judges rule fairly and impartially, or do they commonly render verdicts that 
favor the government or particular interests, whether in return for bribes or other 
reasons? 
 Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial 
decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced? 
 Do powerful private concerns comply with judicial decisions, and are decisions 
that run counter to the interests of powerful actors effectively enforced? 
 
2.    Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters?  Are police under 
direct civilian control? 
 Are defendants’ rights, including the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty, protected? 
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 Are detainees provided access to independent, competent legal counsel? 
 Are defendants given a fair, public, and timely hearing by a competent, 
independent, and impartial tribunal? 
 Are prosecutors independent of political control and influence? 
 Are prosecutors independent of powerful private interests, whether legal or 
illegal? 
 Is there effective and democratic civilian state control of law enforcement 
officials through the judicial, legislative, and executive branches? 
 Are law enforcement officials free from the influence of nonstate actors, including 
organized crime, powerful commercial interests, or other groups?  
 
3.    Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom 
from war and insurgencies? 
 Do law enforcement officials make arbitrary arrests and detentions without 
warrants or fabricate or plant evidence on suspects? 
 Do law enforcement officials beat detainees during arrest and interrogation or use 
excessive force or torture to extract confessions? 
 Are conditions in pretrial facilities and prisons humane and respectful of the 
human dignity of inmates? 
 Do citizens have the means of effective petition and redress when their rights are 
violated by state authorities? 
 Is violent crime either against specific groups or within the general population 
widespread? 
 Is the population subjected to physical harm, forced removal, or other acts of 
violence or terror due to civil conflict or war? 
 
4.    Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments 
of the population? 
 Are members of various distinct groups—including ethnic and religious 
minorities, LGBT and intersex people, and the disabled—able to exercise 
effectively their human rights with full equality before the law? 
 Is violence against such groups widespread, and if so, are perpetrators brought to 
justice? 
 Do members of such groups face legal and/or de facto discrimination in areas 
including employment, education, and housing because of their identification with 
a particular group? 
 Do women enjoy full equality in law and in practice as compared to men? 
 Do noncitizens—including migrant workers and noncitizen immigrants—enjoy 
basic internationally recognized human rights, including the right not to be 
subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, the right to due process of law, 
and the rights of freedom of association, expression, and religion? 
 Do the country’s laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 
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1967 Protocol, and other regional treaties regarding refugees? Has the 
government established a system for providing protection to refugees, including 
against refoulement (the return of persons to a country where there is reason to 
believe they fear persecution)? 
 
G.    Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (0–16 points) 
 
1.    Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or 
institution of higher education? 
 Are there restrictions on foreign travel, including the use of an exit visa system, 
which may be issued selectively? 
 Is permission required from the authorities or nonstate actors to move within the 
country? 
 Do state or non-state actors determine or otherwise influence a person’s type and 
place of employment? 
 Are bribes or other inducements needed to obtain the necessary documents to 
travel, change one’s place of residence or employment, enter institutions of higher 
education, or advance in school? 
 
2.    Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses?  Is 
private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security 
forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime? 
 Are people legally allowed to purchase and sell land and other property, and can 
they do so in practice without undue interference from the government or nonstate 
actors? 
 Does the government provide adequate and timely compensation to people whose 
property is expropriated under eminent domain laws? 
 Are people legally allowed to establish and operate private businesses with a 
reasonable minimum of registration, licensing, and other requirements? 
 Are bribes or other inducements needed to obtain the necessary legal documents 
to operate private businesses? 
 Do private/nonstate actors, including criminal groups, seriously impede private 
business activities through such measures as extortion? 
 
3.    Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of 
marriage partners, and size of family? 
 Is violence against women—including domestic violence, female genital 
mutilation, and rape—widespread, and are perpetrators brought to justice? 
 Is the trafficking of women and/or children abroad for prostitution widespread, 
and is the government taking adequate efforts to address the problem? 
 Do women face de jure and de facto discrimination in economic and social 
matters, including property and inheritance rights, divorce proceedings, and child 
custody matters? 
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 Does the government directly or indirectly control choice of marriage partners 
and other personal relationships through means such as requiring large payments 
to marry certain individuals (e.g., foreign citizens), not enforcing laws against 
child marriage or dowry payments, restricting same-sex relationships, or 
criminalizing extramarital sex? 
 Does the government determine the number of children that a couple may have? 
 Does the government engage in state-sponsored religious/cultural/ethnic 
indoctrination and related restrictions on personal freedoms? 
 Do private institutions, including religious groups, unduly infringe on the rights of 
individuals, including choice of marriage partner, dress, gender expression, etc.? 
 
4.    Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?  
 Does the government exert tight control over the economy, including through 
state ownership and the setting of prices and production quotas? 
 Do the economic benefits from large state industries, including the energy sector, 
benefit the general population or only a privileged few? 
 Do private interests exert undue influence on the economy through monopolistic 
practices, cartels, or illegal blacklists, boycotts, or discrimination? 
 Is entrance to institutions of higher education or the ability to obtain employment 
limited by widespread nepotism and the payment of bribes? 
 Are certain groups, including ethnic or religious minorities, less able to enjoy 
certain economic benefits than others? For example, are certain groups restricted 
from holding particular jobs, whether in the public or the private sector, because 
of de jure or de facto discrimination? 
 Do state or private employers exploit their workers through activities including 
unfairly withholding wages and permitting or forcing employees to work under 
unacceptably dangerous conditions, as well as through adult slave labor and child 
labor? 
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Key to Scores, PR and Ratings, Status 
Political Rights (PR) 
Total Scores PR Rating 
36–40 1 
30–35 2 
24–29 3 
18–23 4 
12–17 5 
6–11 6 
0–5* 7 
Civil Liberties (CL) 
Total Scores   PR Rating 
53–60 1 
44–52 2 
35–43 3 
26–34 4 
17–25 5 
8–16 6 
0–7 7 
Combined Average of the PR and CL Ratings (Freedom Rating) Freedom Status 
1.0 to 2.5 Free 
3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free 
5.5 to 7.0 Not Free 
 
* It is possible for a country’s or territory’s total political rights score to be less than zero 
(between -1 and -4) if it receives mostly or all zeros for each of the 10 political rights 
questions and it receives a sufficiently negative score for political rights discretionary 
question B. In such a case, it would still receive a final political rights rating of 7. 
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Appendix B: System Dynamics Validation Assessment Questions 
 
The following questions outline the questions addressed by the tests listed in Figure 15. 
SYSTEM’S MAPPING 
1. Face validity (structural assessment through deductive process)  
Q: Is the model structure consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of the 
system? 
2. Validity of decision rules (structural focus)  
Q: Do the decision rules capture the behavior of the actors in the system? 
 
QUANTITATIVE MODELING 
3. Physical conservation  
Q: Does the model conform to basic physical laws such as conservation laws? 
4. Dimensional consistency  
Q: Is each equation dimensionally consistent without the use of parameters having 
no real world meaning? 
5. Integration error  
Q: Are the results sensitive to the choice of time step or numerical integration 
method? 
6. Extreme conditions tests (equations focus)  
Q: Does each equation make sense even when its inputs take on extreme 
conditions? 
7. Parameter assessment  
Q: Do all parameters have real world counterparts? Are they consistent with 
relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge of the system? 
8. Basic-behaviors reproduction  
Q: Does the model generate the various modes of behavior observed in the 
system? 
9. Endogenous behavior-reproduction tests  
Q: Does the model pass behavioral reproduction tests without the aid of 
exogenous inputs driving the model in predetermined ways? 
10. Boundary adequacy tests (modes of behavior)  
Q: Does the behavior of the model change significantly when boundary 
assumptions are relaxed? 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
11. Qualitative problem-behavior test  
Q: Does the model qualitatively reproduce the behavior(s) of interest in the 
system? 
12. Boundary adequacy test (problem endogeneity)  
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Q: Are the important concepts for addressing the problem endogenous to the 
model? 
13. Validity of decision rules (policy focus)  
Q: Do the decision rules capture the behaviors of the actors in the system? (policy 
focus) 
14. Assessment of surprise behaviors  
Inspection for unusual, novel, unexpected or surprise behaviors. Q: Does the 
model generate previously unobserved or unrecognized behavior? Does the model 
successfully anticipate the response of the system to novel conditions? 
15. Behavior sensitivity analysis 
Q: Do the modes of behavior generated by the model change significantly when 
assumptions about parameters, boundary, and aggregation are varied over the 
plausible range of uncertainty? 
16. Extreme conditions tests (model behaviors focus)  
Q: Does the model respond plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks, 
and parameters? 
17. Behavior anomaly tests (changed assumptions tests)  
Q: Do anomalous behaviors result when assumptions of the model are changed or 
deleted? 
18. Family member (generalizability)  
Ability to generalize. Q: Can the model generate the behavior observed in other 
instances of the same system? 
 
UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
19. Quantitative sensitivity analysis  
Q: Do the numerical values change significantly when assumptions about 
parameters, boundary, and aggregation are varied over the plausible range of 
uncertainty? 
20. Policy sensitivity analysis  
Q: Do the policy implications change significantly when assumptions about 
parameters are varied over the plausible range of uncertainty? Is the level of 
aggregation appropriate? 
21. Boundary adequacy tests (policy implications) 
 Q: Do the policy recommendations change when the model boundary is 
extended? 
 
FORECASTING AND OPTIMIZATION 
22. Behavior correspondence   
Q: Does the model quantitatively reproduce the behavior(s) of interest in the 
system? 
23. Behavior prediction  
Pattern prediction, event prediction, shifting-mode prediction 
24. Changed-behavior prediction  
(prior to worry about number forecast; behavioral forecast) 
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Appendix C: Vensim Full Model  
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Appendix D: Component Details 
 
The following appendix provides a more detailed view of each component modeled 
within the system as well as any additional tables or regression analysis done for 
respective component data. 
D1 Component A 
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D2 Component B 
 
152 
D3 Component C 
 
153 
D4 Component D 
D4.1 JMP Fit Digital Media Medium Trend 
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D4.2 JMP Fit Television Media Medium Trend 
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D4.3 JMP Fit Radio Media Medium Trend 
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D4.4 JMP Fit Print Media Medium Trend 
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D4.5 Component D Detail Part 1/3 
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D4.6 Component D Detail Part 2/3 
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D4.7 Component D Detail Part 3/3 
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D5 Component E 
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D5.1 JMP Fit GDP growth over time using fit line from 2010-2015 data  
 
162 
D6 Component F 
 
163 
D7 Component G 
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Appendix E: Result Policy Sensitivity Graphs 
Efforts refers to the uncertainty associated with the variable on a [0,1] scale. Factor 
addresses the effect of the variable on the system. Both refers to varying both efforts and 
factors throughout a test of simulations. The y axis for each chart is measured based on 
the Freedom House scale [1,7]. The x axis is measured in time. The units on the y axis do 
not always start at 0. The colors are coordinated with the percent of values within each 
range for the simulations run. For an example of sensitivity graph analysis result 
discussions, the reader is referenced to Section 6.3.3 and Section 6.5. 
E1 Policy 1 Sensitivity Charts 
Human Rights 
Efforts: 
 
Factor: 
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Both: 
 
 
Political Rights 
Efforts: 
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Factor: 
 
 
 
Both: 
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Social Freedoms 
 
Efforts: 
 
 
 
Factor: 
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Both: 
 
 
E2 Policy 2 Sensitivity Charts 
 
 
Human Rights 
Efforts: 
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Factor: 
 
 
 
 
Both: 
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Political Rights 
Efforts: 
 
 
 
Factor: 
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Both: 
 
 
Social Freedoms 
Efforts: 
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Factor: 
 
 
Both: 
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Effect of Policy 2 on Percent supporting democratic ideals movement varying both: 
 
 
E2 Policy 3 Sensitivity Charts 
 
 
Human Rights 
Efforts: 
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Factor: 
 
 
 
 
Both: 
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Political Rights 
Efforts: 
 
 
 
Factor: 
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Both: 
 
 
Social Freedoms 
Efforts: 
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Factor: 
 
 
Both: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
E2 Combined Policy Sensitivity Charts  
 
 
Policy 1 and 2 
Human Rights: 
 
 
Political Rights: 
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Social Freedoms: 
 
 
 
Policy 1 and 3 
Human Rights: 
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Political Rights: 
 
 
 
Social Freedoms: 
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Policy 2 and 3 
Human Rights: 
 
 
 
Political Rights: 
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Social Freedoms: 
 
 
Policy 1, 2 and 3 
Human Rights: 
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Political Rights: 
 
 
 
Social Freedoms: 
 
  
184 
Appendix F: Quad Chart 
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